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COMMENTS
The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector Solution to
Prison Overcrowding
Five days after being released from prison, after serving only
fifteen months of a fifteen-year sentence, Lamonte Fields stood
naked over the bodies of his three victims-his ex-girlfriend, her
mother, and her stepfather.' Fields had been released from prison
under an Oklahoma program providing for mandatory release of
prisoners when prison capacity is reached In fact, a number of
crimes have been committed across the country by inmates released
through programs created in response to the prison over-population
crisis. In addition to statutory prison capacity limitations,4 prisoners
also have been released under court orders addressing
unconstitutional conditions that arise when overcrowding occurs.5 In
1. See Deacon New, Public Safety Should Be a Nonpartisan Subject, THE
SATURDAY OKLAHOMAN, August 10, 1996, at 6.
2. See Paul English, Keating Declaration Recalled Vowed Not to Free Inmates, THE
SATURDAY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 10, 1996, at 12 ("The law mandates [prisoners'] early
release when prison crowding reaches 97.5 percent of capacity for 10 days.").
3. In Massachusetts, a similar incident occurred involving Willie Horton, a convicted
murderer, who upon his early release from prison murdered one victim and raped and
murdered another. See Connie Paige, Rapists Freed Under Weld Watch, Gov Calls for
Registry as Records Show Paroled 13, BOSTON HERALD, Apr., 23, 1996, at 1. In Georgia,
murderer Ronald Kinsman was set free after serving only seven years of his sentence;
soon after his release he killed another victim. See Nancy E. Roman, GOP Ads on Parole
Spark Comebacks Georgia, Louisiana Senate Races Tighten, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1996, at A9.
4. North Carolina passed the Emergency Prison Population Stabilization Act in 1987
to control overcrowding in the state prison system. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-4.1 (1997).
The Act requires an emergency reduction in the inmate population whenever the state
prison population exceeds a specified number for 15 consecutive days. See id.; see also
N.C. DEP'T OF CORRECTION, A MASTER PLAN FOR THE ALLOCATION OF $87,500,000,
REPORT TO THE 1993 SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 26
(Feb. 25, 1993) (explaining the state's Emergency Prison Population Stabilization Act).
Other states also have enacted legislation limiting prison capacity. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 947.146(1), (2) (West 1996) (giving the Control Release Authority power to
release prisoners if the prison system reaches full capacity); id. at § 944.023 (defining
capacity); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-2-14 (1997) (allowing a state board to release prisoners
when prisons reach full capacity if the state's governor declares state of emergency);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 906.5(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (allowing the early release of
prisoners in order to control prison population).
5. See Carty v. Schneider, 986 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D.V.I. 1997) (requiring the
reduction of a particular prison's population to improve its unconstitutional conditions);
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1984 alone, more than 17,000 state prisoners were released early due
to overcrowding.6
Prison populations almost tripled between 1975 and 1990. One
commentator has pointed out, "only half in jest, that if the same rate
of incarceration continues or the rate increases somewhat, the
number of people in prison in the year 2053 will be greater than those
who are out of prison."8 Prison construction has failed to keep up
with the demand for prison space. In 1990, federal and state prisons
housed 771,200 prisoners in space designed to accommodate between
586,500 and 641,800 inmates.9
Albro v. County of Onondaga, 627 F. Supp. 1280, 1288 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); Gates v.
Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732, 743-44 (N.D. Miss. 1976), affd, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977)
(same); see also Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 396 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that
remedial measures must be taken to improve unconstitutional prison conditions); Paul
Feldman & Eric Lichtblau, L.A. County Jail Inmates Serve Only 25% of Sentences, L.A.
TIMES, May 20, 1996, at Al ("The burgeoning early release crisis has its roots in court
edicts beginning in the 1970s that capped the County Jail population when chronic
overcrowding collided with constitutional obligations requiring humane treatment of
prisoners.").
6. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE
INTERESTS 25 n.11 (1988) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1984, at 1, 7 tbl.11 (1985)). In 1983, over 21,000
prisoners were released early to relieve overcrowding. See Jeff Bleich, The Politics of
Prison Crowding, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1173 (1989); see also Wesley Smith & Douglas
Seay, Reining in Federal Judges: The Crime Bill's Unexpected Gift to the States, F.Y.I No.
40 (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 11, 1994
<http:llwww.heritage.orgllibrary/categories/crimelawlfyi4O.html> (commenting that
hundreds of thousands of violent offenders have been released early due to judicial orders
requiring reduced prison populations).
7. See Charles W. Thomas & Charles H. Logan, The Development, Present Status,
and Future Potential of Correctional Privatization in America, in PRIVATIZING
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 213, 215 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993);
KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 89 (1997) (noting that the U.S. prison population tripled between
1980 and 1994); THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COMMISSION 15 (Steven R. Donzinger ed., 1996) (same). Several commentators
have blamed legislators for the prison population crisis, criticizing the enlargement of
anti-crime legislation without planning for the resulting increase in prisoners. See Warren
I. Cikins, Partial Privatization of Prison Operations: Let's Give It a Chance, in
PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra at 13; see also CHARLES R. RING,
CONTRACrING FOR THE OPERATION OF PRIVATE PRISONS: PROS & CONS 1 (1987)
("Americans have always been far more willing to support policies aimed at increasing
the certainty and severity of punishment for convicted offenders than they have been to
pay the costs of incarcerating the influx of prisoners which result from such policies.");
Gary W. Bowman et al., Introduction to PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS,
supra, at 1 (identifying the reasons for the national high rate of incarceration as "adoption
of federal and state mandatory minimum sentences, tightened parole eligibility criteria,
and greater reliance on imprisonment.").
8. Cikins, supra note 7, at 14.
9. See Dana C. Joel, The Privatization of Secure Adult Prisons: Issues and Evidence,
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The United States Department of Justice has determined that in
order to manage periodic maintenance as well as to provide special
housing for protective custody, disciplinary cases, and emergency
needs, a prison should maintain reserve capacity.10 In 1996, however,
a report issued by the Department of Justice revealed that on
average, state prisons were operating at 116 percent of capacity, and
federal prisons were operating at 125 percent of capacity." As a
result of prison overpopulation and declining funds for prison
maintenance and rehabilitative programs, many prisoners are being
placed in "understaffed, vermin-infested" facilities. 2 In addition,
overcrowding has also increased the instances of violence and the
development of infectious and stress-related diseases within
confinement facilities. 3
in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 51, 51.
10. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN,
PRISONERS IN 1996, at 8 (June 1997).
11. See id. at 1; see also Justin Brooks, How Can We Sleep While the Beds are
Burning? The Tumultuous Prison Culture of Attica Flourishes in American Prisons
Twenty-Five Years Later, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 159, 179 (1996) (explaining that "the
average American prison is operating at 114.9% of its rated capacity"). In December
1995, state prisons operated at 14% to 25% over capacity and federal prisons operated at
26% over capacity. See James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons,
Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1004 n.1 (1997) (citing
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN, PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES 1995, at I (Aug. 1996)).
12. Richard D. Nobleman, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: Prison Conditions and the Eighth
Amendment Standard, 24 PAC. L.J. 275, 279 (1992). At the beginning of the decade,
federal prisons were operating at 170% of capacity. See DAVID N. AMMONS ET AL., THE
OPTION OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY DELIBERATIONS 4, 6
(1992) (citing Thomas & Logan, supra, note 7, at 216). Nine state prisons were also
overwhelmed, operating at 150% of capacity. See id. Prison conditions have deteriorated
to the point that they "shock the conscience, if not the stomach." Ira P. Robbins,
Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813, 815 (1987).
13. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (discussing how the "atmosphere of
violence" was at least partly attributable to prison overcrowding). Several circuit courts
and district courts already had come to this conclusion. See Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d
1364, 1373-74 (5th Cir. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567-68 (10th Cir. 1980);
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977), modified on other grounds sub
nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th
Cir. 1974); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 968-70 (D.R.I. 1977); Pugh v. Locke,
406 F. Supp. 318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976), modified on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); see also Barton L. Ingraham & Charles F. Wellford, The
Totality of Conditions Test in Eighth Amendment Litigation, in AMERICA'S
CORRECTIONAL CRISIS: PRISON POPULATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 24-28 (Stephen
D. Gottfredson & Ralph B. Taylor eds., 1987) (explaining that prison overpopulation
increases the amount of violent acts); Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth
Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 404
(1995) ("Are the potential enhanced dangers associated with prison overpopulation-
increased violence and unchecked housing of dangerous and possibly virus-infected
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The majority of states operate prisons that are in violation of
prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights.14 Overcrowding has resulted in
nearly one quarter of all American prisons being placed under court
orders or judicial consent decrees.1 5 At the end of 1984, thirty-three
states had prisons subject to court orders or consent decrees
mandating improved conditions, with overcrowding as the foremost
complaint. 6 By 1990, the number of states with prisons operating
under court order had risen to forty-one. 7 Many of these court
orders have assigned felons to inadequate and "unsuitable local jails
and prisons that cannot provide for productive rehabilitation and
employment activities."' In addition, in order to alleviate
overcrowding, court orders have forced open prison doors, awarding
violent criminals early and unwarranted release.19
A 1985 report estimated that states planned to spend five billion
dollars just to meet estimated prison growth from 1985 to 1995.20 The
growth in prison population in the United States in 1989 alone would
have required "one 700-bed jail and one 1,600-bed prison during each
and every week" costing "$115,000,000 per week and 5.98 billion
inmates with the general prison population-a sufficiently substantial intolerable risk to
call the Eighth Amendment into play?"); Carl B. Clements, Case/Comment, Crowded
Prisons: A Review of the Psychological and Environmental Effects, 3 LAv & HUM.
BEHAV. 217, 217-25 (1979) (discussing deteriorating prison conditions); Pamela M.
Rosenblatt, Note, The Dilemma of Overcrowding in the Nation's Prisons: What are
Constitutional Conditions and What Can Be Done?, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 489, 492-
93 (1991) ("When jails and prisons are overcrowded, even the most benign administrators
have difficulty with sanitation, feeding, recreation schedules, work arrangements, and
health service. Overcrowding causes fire hazards, inadequate or delayed medical
services, unsanitary food and kitchen conditions, and increased rates of violence."
(citations omitted)); see generally Garvin McCain et al., The Relationship Between Illness
Complaints and Degree of Crowding in a Prison Environment, 8 ENV'T & BEHAV. 283,
283-89 (1976) (discussing the negative effects overpopulation has on prisoner health).
14. See Nobleman, supra note 12, at 276 ("As of January 1, 1990, 41 states and the
District of Columbia had some or all of their prisons operating under court order due to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement."); see also Stephen D. Gottfredson & Sean
McConville, Introduction to AMERICA'S CORRECTIONAL CRISIS: PRISON POPULATIONS
AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that "[a]s of February 1986, 46 States
and U.S. territories either were under court order, or were involved in litigation likely to
result in court orders").
15. See Nancy Gibbs, Truth, Justice and the Reno Way, TIME, July 12, 1993, at 20, 26.
16. See Ingraham & Wellford, supra note 13, at 13.
17. See Nobleman, supra note 12, at 276.
18. Bowman et al., supra note 7, at 2. Such activities exist in prisons in order to
reduce recidivism. See id.
19. See Gibbs, supra note 15, at 26; see also note 5 (listing cases in which courts
required the reduction of prison population).
20. See JOAN MULLEN ET AL., OFFICE OF DEV., TESTING AND DISSEMINATION,
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS
33 (1985).
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dollars for the entire year."21 Because reports estimate that federal
correctional facilities are operating at 25 percent above capacity and
that states are struggling between 16 percent and 25 percent above
capacity, the prison crisis does not appear likely to subside in the
near future. 22
Given the alarming growth of the prison population, the
unconstitutional conditions of current prison facilities, and the high
costs of incarceration,' new alternatives must be considered to
provide adequate prison facilities.24 This Comment proposes that
privatizing prison facilities may provide a legitimate solution to
America's prison overpopulation crisis.
Part I briefly discusses the history of private prisons in
America3l Part II analyzes the legal issues presented by privatization
of prisons, specifically addressing the applicability of the
nondelegation doctrine and § 1983 civil liability to the private prison
context.2 6 It also discusses the applicability of § 1983 immunity to
private parties, reviewing how the district courts and the Supreme
Court have dealt with this issue in both the public and private
sectors.2 7 Finally, Part II reviews the Supreme Court's recent analysis
in Richardson v. McKnight,2 which limited the extension of qualified
immunity for prison guards at private facilities.29
Part III of this Comment notes that clear statutory guidelines
and performance-oriented contracts may not only reduce current
expenditures on prison facilities but also improve their quality and
help alleviate the current prison crisis.30 Finally, Part IV concludes
that despite the legal issues, prison privatization offers a legitimate,
cost-effective alternative for reducing the population crisis faced by
21. Thomas & Logan, supra note 7, at 216. It would be less expensive to finance a
college education for each prisoner. See Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private
Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 531, 540 (1989).
22. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 10, at 8; Thomas & Logan, supra
note 7, at 216.
23. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
24. Gottfredson and McConville see only four possibilities: (1) "build more prisons";
(2) "reduce the intake into the prison system"; (3) "accelerate releases from the prison
system"; or (4) "tolerate the existing and deteriorating situation." Gottfredson &
McConville, supra note 14, at 5. This Comment considers the first of these options.
25. See infra notes 32-66 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 67-176 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 177-274 and accompanying text.
28. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
29. See infra notes 275-359 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 360-418 and accompanying text.
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American prisons.'
I. THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA
Although concerns over current prison conditions have just
recently brought prison privatization to the public's attention, private
prisons are rooted in the history of the American penal system. 32
Incarceration was originally used to punish and detain convicted
criminals so that they could repent for their sins.33 Initially, private
prisons in the American colonies operated under an entrepreneurial
system, requiring prisoners to pay for the expenses of staying in the
prison, including all transactions between entry and discharge.r4
Consequently, a prisoner was denied release until he paid off all of
his debts to the prison as well as to society.35 As a result, poor
prisoners were abused by the system and forced to work to near
starvation, and sometimes death, in order to pay for their expenses. 36
In 1666, Raymond Stapleford tried a different approach when he
built a prison in Maryland, one of the first privately-run colonial
prisons.3 7 Stapleford contracted the prison labor to private parties.3 1
In 1790, Pennsylvania's Walnut Street Jail was "the new nation's
first true penitentiary. '39  The Walnut Street Jail was state
31. See infra Part IV and accompanying text.
32. See AMMONS ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 ("The current interest in privatization of
prison operations is more aptly characterized as a rebirth of that option rather than as a
discovery of it.").
33. See Jack Betts, A Short History of Corrections in North Carolina, in NORTH
CAROLINA FOCUS: AN ANTHOLOGY ON STATE GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND POLICY
695, 695 (Mebane Rash Whitman & Ran Coble eds., 1996); GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT &
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 80-81 (Herman R. Lantz ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1964)
(1833) (writing that the Quakers believed that a penitentiary provided a place for a
convict to repent his sins as well as suffer punishment for them).
34. See Sean McConville, Aid from Industry? Private Corrections and Prison
Crowding, in AMERICA'S CORRECTIONAL CRISIS: PRISON POPULATIONS AND PUBLIC
POLICY, supra note 13, at 221, 223; David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of
Deference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 YALE L. J. 815, 815-16 (1987) ("In the
early years of the United States,... private jailers fulfill[ed] a task that the young nation
was initially unable to perform.").
35. See McConville, supra note 34, at 223.
36. See id.
37. See Alexis M. Durham, III, Origins of Interest in the Privatization of Punishment:
The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century American Experience, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 111
(1989). Stapleford built the prison in exchange for 10,000 pounds of tobacco and was
made keeper of the prison for life. See id.
38. See id. For an argument that prisons should return to the old contract system of
labor, see Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners' Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 342, 374-
98 (1998).-
39. Garvey, supra note 38, at 348.
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supervised, but private contractors purchased raw materials that
prisoners turned into products that could be sold by the contractors
on the open market.40 The Walnut Street system, however, was an
economic disappointment.4'
In 1816, New York experimented with prison privatization by
building the Auburn Prison.42 The New York legislature insisted that
the Auburn facility be both self-supporting and profitable.43 To
achieve this goal, the prison actively contracted with private
companies who willingly paid for the cheap prisoner labor.,
Louisiana took the New York experiment a step further, leasing
an entire penitentiary to the private sector, which took the prisoners
at no charge.45 Both Texas and California used similar systems,
leasing out entire prisons to private industry.4 6 Connecticut, Florida,
Massachusetts, and Kentucky also leased their prisons and were able
to turn a profit during the early to mid-1800s.47 In order to
compensate for prison overpopulation and escalating costs, Virginia
contracted with private parties to feed, house, and pay daily labor
fees to the prisoners.' In addition to these private prison
experiments, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Michigan all have had
prisons either privately run or leased to private firms at one time.49
Although profitable and innovative, the early combination of
incarceration facilities and private industry turned abusive." Private
contractors often "worked inmates to death, beat or killed them for
minor rule infractions, or failed to provide them with the quantity
and quality of life's necessities (food, clothing, shelter)."'" In
addition to the affront to human dignity, businesses and laborers
40. See id. at 349.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 350.
43. See Alexis M. Durham III, The Future of Correctional Privatization: Lessons
from the Past, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 33, 35-36;
John G. Dipiano, Note, Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-First
Century, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 171,176 (1995).
44. See Durham, supra note 43, at 36.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 37.
47. See id. at 37-38. Florida made $300,000 from its lease with a private company in
1911. See id. at 38.
48. See id. at 36.
49. See JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., PRIVATE PRISONS 2-3 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst.
of Justice Crime File Study Guide No. NCJ-104561,1988).
50. See AMMONS ET AL., supra note 12, at 5.
51. DIIuLIo, supra note 49, at 3. In one private prison, the menu for prisoners
included such delicacies as "spoiled beef, maggoty hams, wormy flour, rusty mackerel and
coarse brown bread." KENNETH LAMOTr, CHRONICLES OF SAN QUENTIN 45 (1961).
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alike protested against the unfair competition created by private
individuals using less expensive inmate labor. Furthermore, a desire
to use prisons for reformatory purposes gained support.53 As a result
of these factors, the private prison industry fell apart. The last relics
of prisoner leasing by private contractors ended in Florida and
Alabama in the 1920s.54
The shift to public administration of prisons did little to improve
the conditions facing prisoners. 5 Although private prisons may have
historically provided inhumane living conditions, the current
problems of overcrowding and high costs have led to a resurgence of
support for prison privatization. 6 President Reagan's creation of the
52- See DIIULIO, supra note 49, at 3. Protests led to the Labor Law of 1842,
prohibiting prisoners from working at a trade unless they had learned the trade prior to
prison. See Durham, supra note 43, at 38. A report read at the Louisiana State
Democratic Convention in 1883 declared:
"The employment of convicts outside the walls of the Penitentiary is detrimental
to the interests of the honest labor[,] ... bring[ing] .. slave labor in competition
with honest industry to the great pecuniary profit of the penitentiary lessee, but
with disastrous results as far as the honest free labor of the state is concerned."
Id. at 38 (quoting M.T. CARLETON, POLITICS AND PUNISHMENTS 39 (1971)). The most
visible protest of the use of inmate labor occurred in 1891 when protesting miners in
Tennessee stormed a private prison, releasing over 400 inmates. See id. at 39. These
protests, as well as the Great Depression, led to additional legislation to limit the
profitability of prisoner labor. See AMMONS ET AL., supra note 12, at 5. The Hawes-
Cooper Act, passed by Congress in 1929, allowed states to enact legislation banning the
importation of prisoner manufactured products from other states, further limiting the
profitability of private prisons. See Act of Jan. 19, 1929, Pub. L. No. 669, ch. 79, § 1, 45
Stat. 1084, 1084 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11507 (1994)). In 1935, legislation was enacted
requiring prison goods to be labeled as made by prisoners. See Act of July 24, 1935, Pub.
L. No. 215, ch. 412, § 2, 49 Stat. 494, 494-95 (codified at 18 U.S.C § 1762 (1994)). This
legislation also prohibited the entry of prison goods into states banning their sale. See id.
§ 1, 49 Stat. at 494 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1994)). In 1936, the Walsh-Healey Act
prohibited the use of prison labor in federal government contracts exceeding $10,000. See
Walsh-Healey Act, Pub. L. No. 846, ch. 881, § 1(d), 49 Stat. 2036,2037 (1936) (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. 35(c) (1994)). Four years later, the Sumners-Amherst Act made it
a federal criminal offense to sell prisoner-made goods through interstate commerce. See
Sumners-Amherst Act, Pub. L. No. 851, ch. 872, 54 Stat. 1134, 1134 (1940) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1994)).
53. See McConville, supra note 34, at 223.
54. See id. at 222-23.
55. See id. at 222 (citing THORSTEN SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 176
(1976)). Public prison "scandals, defects, and abuses ... [have been] so voluminous ...
that undoubtedly many of the difficulties that the early prison reformers thought arose
exclusively from the entrepreneurial interest in prisons can now be demonstrated to
inhere in prison systems of any complexion." Id.
56. See Garvey, supra note 38, at 342 (arguing that American prisons should return to
the old contract system of labor); Robbins, supra note 21, at 540; David Yarden, Book
Note, Prisons, Profits, and the Private Sector Solution, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 326 (1994)
(reviewing PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Gary W. Bowman et al eds.,
1993)); Daniel Klaidman, Letting Private Companies Run Federal Prisons, CONN. L.
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President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control and its subsequent
investigation of opportunities to cut government spending through
privatizing governmental functions helped add to a renewed
enthusiasm for potential prison privatization.5 7 The privatization
movement was further bolstered by the 1994 congressional elections
and the Republican Party's "Contract with America.""8
To reintroduce the private sector to the prison industry, states,
counties, and cities have been contracting with private corporations. 59
Since the early 1980s, a growing number of jurisdictions have enacted
legislation authorizing the use of private prisons." Until 1984,
however, only nonsecurity and community-based facilities were
privatized, including "halfway houses, holding centers for illegal
aliens, and juvenile detention centers."61 The savings provided by
TRIB., Feb. 20, 1975, at 8.
57. In 1988, the President's Commission on Privatization recommended that the
Bureau of Prisons contract with the private sector to operate medium and maximum
security prison facilities. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-95-177,
BUREAU OF PRISONS: RECENT CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 6
(1995) (statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, Administration of Justice Issues,
General Government Division).
58. See Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss ... ", 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1253, 1253
(1996). The Contract with America was the Republican Party's alleged attempt to "'end
... government that is too big, too intrusive and too easy with the public's money.'" Id.
at 1253 (quoting the Contract with America).
59. See Robert G. Schaffer, The Public Interest in Private Party Immunity: Extending
Qualified Immunity from 42 U.S. C. § 1983 to Private Prisons, 45 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1049-50
(1996) (noting that about one-third of the states have adopted enabling legislation
because of the chance that privatization will save costs). In 1988, the State of New
Mexico awarded Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA") a contract to design,
construct and operate a 200-bed multi-security level prison. See Charles H. Logan, Well
Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement in Private and Public Prisons, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 577, 577 (1992). In 1995, Texas awarded CCA a contract to operate a
2,000 bed facility. See CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMERICA, CCA: A QUALITY, COST-
EFFECTIVE SOLUTION 4 (July 1996) (corporate brochure). In 1990, Wackenhut
Corrections Corporation was awarded a contract to manage a 610 bed medium-security
facility in Louisiana and another contract for constructing and operating a 500 bed
minimum-medium facility in Texas. See Wackenhut Corrections Corporation,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 1990, at 138. In 1996, North Carolina awarded a $70 million
contract to U.S. Corrections Corporation for the operation of two 500 bed prisons. See
Dennis Patterson, Kentucky Company Wins $70 Million Contract for Two Private Prisons,
A.P. POL. SERV., July 3, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ASSOCPPS Database, 1996 WL
5392729.
60. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.031(a) (Michie 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-1-201 (West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-106(3) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 41-24-103 (1997); Thomas & Logan, supra note 7, at 214.
61. Bowman et al., supra note 7, at 7. In 1984, CCA, the largest private prison
contractor had only contracted to manage three small, minimum-security prisons: a 50-
bed juvenile detention center in Memphis, a processing center to house illegal aliens in
Houston, and the Silverdale Work Farm in Chattanooga. See CORRECTIONS CORP. OF
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these early experiments along with the continuing prison crisis has
encouraged the development and acceptance of private prisons.'
During the 1980s, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Montana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah adopted legislation
enabling the use of private prisons.63 More than one hundred private
prison facilities are now operating in the United States.64  The
number of inmates in private prisons is expected to grow thirty
percent per year.65
Important lessons can be learned from America's bleak private
prison history.66 Knowledge gained from previous mistakes and the
benefits achievable through effective use of privatization provide a
foundation for current private prison experiments.
II. LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS
Although prison privatization has already begun in several
states,67 unclear and often unanswered legal issues envelop the
privatization process. First, opponents of privatization argue that the
operation of prisons is solely a governmental function and that the
nondelegation doctrine makes legislation authorizing prison
privatization unconstitutional.68 Second, there are concerns that
prisoners will not receive the same constitutionally guaranteed rights
AMERICA, supra note 59, at 4.
62. See Bowman et al.,supra note 7, at 6-7.
63. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.031(a) (Michie 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-
106 (Michie 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-201 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 957.03(1) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-106(3) (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1-17 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 41 (West 1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 41-24-103 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-26 (1996).
64. See Morning Edition: Tennessee Private Prisons Debate (NPR radio broadcast,
Nov. 13, 1997), available in WESTLAW, MORNED Database, 1997 WL 12823849.
65. See Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's Prison Privatization
Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 372 (1997). In 1996, 3% of the adult prisoner
population was housed in private prisons, a 32% increase from the previous year. See
James L. Ahlstrom, Note, McKnight v. Rees: Delineating the Qualified Immunity
"Haves" and "Have-Nots" Among Private Parties, 1997 BYU L. REV. 385,385 (1997).
66. See DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC
CONCERNS 44 (1995) (discussing "warning signs" that are still of concern today).
67. See AMMONS ET AL., supra note 12, at 30 fig.5 (mapping locations of private
prisons and listing the corporations that are operating them); see also supra notes 59-60
and accompanying text (discussing recent contracts and listing states).
68. See W.J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional
Institutions: The Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REV. 829, 849 (1987); Robbins,
supra note 21, at 562-63; Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An Improper
Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 662-63 (1987) (arguing
that the United States Supreme Court may find a delegation unconstitutional when "the
delegatee has private interests or motives at stake").
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in a privately-operated facility as they would receive in a
government-operated facility. Because § 198369 only provides
protection against persons acting under color of state law, opponents
fear that this protection is precluded when the government contracts
with private industry.7" Furthermore, assuming that civil rights
protections will be extended to prisoners in private facilities, a third
legal issue arises whether immunities commonly extended to
government officials will be extended to employees of private
facilities. 71 The following sections discuss these legal issues related to
privatization and conclude that these concerns, although not
unfounded, should not inhibit prison privatization.
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine2
The nondelegation doctrine is grounded in Article I, section 1 of
the United States Constitution, which states that "[a]l legislative
Power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States. '73  Accordingly, no legislative powers may be delegated by
Congress to another entity. In 1935, the Supreme Court in Schechter
Poultry Corporation v. United States74 applied the nondelegation
doctrine to invalidate the National Industrial Recovery Act (the
"Recovery Act"),75 which had delegated certain legislative authority
to the President.76 Section 3 of the Recovery Act authorized the
President to approve a code of fair competition offered by a trade or
industrial association if he found the code did not impose unfair
membership admission restrictions and was not designed to eliminate
small businesses or promote monopolies.77 The Court held that
section 3 was an unconstitutional delegation due to its broad
declaration of authority and the lack of both guidance and
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
70. See infra notes 132-76 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of civil
rights protection to prisoners in private prisons).
71. See infra notes 177-359 and accompanying text (discussing the availability of
immunity for private prison guards).
72. Although delegation issues exist at the state level based on state constitutions,
this section focuses on the nondelegation doctrine from a federal standpoint. Delegation
issues have been dealt with inconsistently at the state level. See David M. Lawrence,
Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 649-51 (1986). For a
comprehensive look at state-level delegation issues, see Robbins, supra note 21, at 557-73.
73. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
74. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
75. Pub. L. No. 73-67, ch 90, 48 Stat. 195, 195, abrogated by Schechter, 295 U.S. at
541-42.
76. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 541-42.
77. See id. at 521-23.
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restrictions on the President's authority.78
Under the Schechter Court's analysis, the nondelegation doctrine
may be used to invalidate legislation if it authorizes private parties to
"decide either what the law shall be or when a law shall be
effective. ' 79 Therefore, anytime the government delegates legislative
or executive authority to a private party, an issue arises as to whether
that private party has any right to exercise that authority. 0 Citing the
nondelegation doctrine, opponents of prison privatization argue that
"only government can legitimately exercise the police power and that
it cannot or should not be delegated to the private sector."81 By
analogy, opponents contend that just as Congress may not delegate
legislative power to the President, governments may not delegate
their power of incarceration to private corporationsn In 1986, the
American Bar Association supported this argument, claiming that
"incarceration is an inherent function of the government and that the
government should not abdicate its responsibility by turning over
prison operation to private industry."'83
78. See id. at 541-42.
79. 1 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4.11 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th
ed 1992).
80. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The
Constitutionality in Federal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 441, 456-57 (1989) (noting that
Schechter, as well as Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), create concerns about
government authority to delegate legislative tasks); Susan Ross-Ackerman, Comment,
Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J.
1206, 1216 (1994) (noting government concern when delegating public tasks to private
individuals).
81. Cikins, supra note 7, at 17. The concern about delegation is grounded in a fear
that the private party will be "less accountable to the public than are legislators, who must
face re-election, or administrators, who must report to the President." A. Michael
Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 575
(1995); see also Field, supra note 68, at 668 (arguing that "[p]rison privatization
represents the government's abdication of one of its most basic responsibilities to its
people").
82. See Ratliff, supra note 65, at 382 (discussing the arguments of private prison
opponents); see also Jan Elvin, A Civil Liberties View of Private Prison, PRISON J.,
Autumn-Winter 1985, at 48, 51 (arguing that "[n]o one but the state should possess the
awesome responsibility or power to take away an individual's freedom; freedom should
not be contracted to the lowest bidder"). Mark A. Cuniff, the executive director of the
National Association of Criminal Justice Planners, claims imprisonment is "'the ultimate
sanction that a state has available to it to enforce laws. Because only the government can
promulgate and enforce the laws, only the government should be involved in provision of
those services.'" Elizabeth Leland, Private Prisons: Businesses Want a Piece of the Rock,
in NORTH CAROLINA FoCus: AN ANTHOLOGY ON STATE GOVERNMENT, POLITICS,
AND POLICY, supra note 33, at 705, 708 (quoting Mark A. Cuniff); see Field, supra note
68, at 668-70.
83. Connie Mayer, Legal Issues Surrounding Private Operation of Prisons, 24 CRIM.
L. BULL. 309, 319 (1986).
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While the nondelegation doctrine may be an attractive tool for
arguing against the government using privatization as a shield from
liability, private prison opponents fail to recognize that the
nondelegation issue regarding private prisons is not whether the
government can eliminate its liability, but rather whether the
government may delegate its incarceration function. The answer to
this second concern seems to be yes.' In recognizing the need for
flexibility, the drafters of the Constitution provided the Necessary
and Proper Clause to compensate for future governing needs,
allowing delegation of authority "sufficient to effect its purposes."85
Delegation has become a necessary legislative tool in an increasingly
demanding rulemaking society.86
While courts have not specifically addressed whether delegating
incarceration authority to the private sector is a violation of the
nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme Court has not invalidated any
delegation of various governmental functions in the last half-
century.87 Furthermore, regardless of the current viability of the
nondelegation doctrine, the doctrine does not appear applicable to
84. See Hampton v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928). In Hampton, the Supreme Court
upheld the Tariff Act of 1922, tit. 3, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 858, 941-42 (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 154, 156 (1928)), which authorized the President to regulate customs duties.
The Court explained Congress's need to delegate certain authority and discretion out of
convenience and responsiveness to changing future conditions. See Hampton, 276 U.S. at
406-07. The Court explained that the parties exercising the delegated authority are not
actually encroaching on legislative authority vested in Congress because "the power has
already been exercised legislatively by the body vested with that power under the
Constitution." Id. at 407. "'The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.' " Id. (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v.
Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852)). See also Bowman et al., supra note 7, at 9
("The U.S. Constitution, and federal laws do not prohibit private companies of managing
all security types of correction institutions."); Cikins, supra note 7, at 17 (explaining that
although the government may not be able to avoid liability by using the public sector, that
does not "precluded the utilization of the private sector"); Dipiano, supra note 43, at 199
("[I]f ... private prison officials made improper decisions about how to manage their
facilities the nondelegation doctrine is of no avail.").
85. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18. In McCullock v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), the Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause expanded Congress's
powers, enabling Congress to create a federal reserve bank. See id. at 409-12. The
Necessary and Proper Clause may similarly expand Congress's power by allowing
legislation enabling the federal government to contract prison management to
corporations. See Robbins, supra note 12, at 823.
86. See 1 KENNETH DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (3d ed. 1994).
87. See Linda G. Cooper, Minimizing Liability with Private Management of
Correctional Facilities, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at
131, 132.
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prison privatization because a transfer of the incarceration function is
not a delegation of legislative authority.88
The applicability of the nondelegation doctrine to privatizing
prisons is further weakened by the fact that "a consensus of academic
commentators and Supreme Court Justices view the nondelegation
doctrine as a dead letter."8 9  In order to fully address the topic,
however, the following sections will analyze the applicability of the
doctrine to the delegation of incarceration authority, applying several
different tests that have been employed by courts in addressing issues
of unconstitutional delegation. These tests include the analysis
Justice Rehnquist proposed in Industrial Union Department, AFL-
8& See Dipiano, supra note 43, at 198-99. Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution-
the basis of the nondelegation doctrine-vests all legislative authority in Congress. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Since the constitutional basis for the nondelegation doctrine limits
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, authorization of private prison
operation does not violate the doctrine because the private prisons are not authorized to
perform legislative functions. Libertarians make another argument for the inapplicability
of the nondelegation doctrine, stating that the "source of legitimate power is in the hands
of the individual citizens;" therefore, private prisons are justified "on the basis of the
limited role of the state and the individualistic concept of punishment." SHICHOR, supra
note 66, at 51. The right of imprisonment is in the people and consequently can be
performed as readily by a contractor. Talk of the Nation: The Privatization of Prisons
(NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 9, 1997), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File,
Transcript No. 97010902-211 (comments of Professor Charles Logan, Associate Head of
Sociology, University of Connecticut) [hereinafter Talk of the Nation].
89. Ratliff, supra note 65, at 383. The federal courts have "accepted, often without
comment, delegations of federal power ... ." Lawrence, supra note 72, at 648. Justice
Marshall once stated that the nondelegation doctrine "has been virtually abandoned by
the Court for all practical purposes." Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co.,
415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in
part). For cases upholding delegation of traditionally governmental authority to private
parties, see Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 44, 51 (1939) (upholding the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938,7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1281-1393 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998), even though
it involved private farmers approving marketing quotas on crops); Currin v. Wallace, 306
U.S. 1, 15 (1939) (upholding procedure in Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935, 7 U.S.C.A.
§§ 511-511q (West 1980 & Supp. 1998), which delegated authority to private tobacco
farmers to vote on whether or not they wanted certain provisions of the act applied to
them); Building & Constr. Trades' Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 712 F.2d 611, 616-19
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a to 276a-5 (1994),
which based wages for federal public works projects on private wages). For additional
discussion of the Supreme Court's and state courts' acceptance of Congressional
delegations, see George W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American
Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 668-72 (1975). However, Justice Rehnquist, in his
concurring opinion in American Petroleum Institute, attempted to revive the
nondelegation doctrine. See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672-76 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment); supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence).
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CIO v. American Petroleum Institute," the delegation concerns
discussed in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,91 and the analysis offered in
Todd & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission.'
1. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute
In 1935 and 1936, the Supreme Court used the nondelegation
doctrine to declare unconstitutional three acts providing the
President with unguided authorityY Since then, the Supreme Court
has not used the nondelegation doctrine to declare any delegation of
governmental authority unconstitutional. 94 In 1980, however, then-
Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion in American Petroleum
Institute, reintroduced the nondelegation doctrine.95  This case
addressed Congress's delegation of authority to the Secretary of
Labor to develop standards to ensure safe and healthy working
conditions for American workers under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970.96 The case specifically dealt with exposure
standards for benzene, a known carcinogen, which were set by the
Secretary of Labor.97 A plurality held that the benzene exposure
limit set for workers by the Secretary of Labor was invalid because
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration failed to use
90. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality).
91. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
92. 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977).
93. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (striking down a statute
that granted coal workers the authority to vote on and set wages and hours that would be
binding on all mine workers within the voting region); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (holding that § 3 of the Recovery Act was an
unconstitutional delegation of authority due to the broad authority delegated to the
President and the lack of guidance and restrictions); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (holding that Congress's failure to establish any guiding policy or
standard or to draft any limiting rules made the authority delegated to the President to
regulate transportation of petroleum products between the states an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority).
94. See Robbins, supra note 21, at 544.
95. See American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 672-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment).
96. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-671 (1994). The
Occupational Safety and Health Act (the "Act") was intended to ensure "safe and
healthful working conditions." American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 611. It authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to promulgate health standards. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1994).
The Act defines an occupational safety and health standard as one that "requires
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices ... reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1994).
97. See American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 611 (plurality).
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appropriate findings to support the standard.9" In a concurring
opinion, Justice Rehnquist explained the applicability of the
nondelegation doctrine to this particular situation.99 He defined the
purpose of the nondelegation doctrine as "ensur[ing] to the extent
consistent with orderly governmental administration that important
[policy] choices ... are made by Congress.""1 Drawing on precedent,
he stated that the nondelegation doctrine guarantees that the party
granted the governmental authority is provided with an " 'intelligible
principle' to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion,"11 and it
enables "courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated
legislative discretion ... to test that exercise against ascertainable
standards."102
Applying these purposes to the facts, Justice Rehnquist found
the Occupational Safety and Health Act provision to be invalid as an
unconstitutional delegation to a governmental agency.103 He would
have held that the vague standard provided by the statute created
uncertainty." 4  Justice Rehnquist suggested that this uncertainty
demonstrated that Congress, "the governmental body best suited and
most obligated" to make the decision, had unlawfully delegated its
authority to the Secretary of Labor.1 5
However, important differences exist between the situation in
American Petroleum Institute and the situation created by privatizing
prisons. First, since American Petroleum Institute dealt specifically
with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a
government agency, Justice Rehnquist's analysis may not be
applicable to a private entity such as a private prison. 6 Second,
Justice Rehnquist's concern "centered on delegation of congressional
responsibility for deciding major social policy."''1 "A delegation to a
private prison company that has adequate statutory guidelines does
98. See id. at 653 (plurality).
99. See id. at 672-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. Id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); J.W. Hampton Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928)).
102. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Arizona v. California, 375
U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90, 106 (1946)).
103. See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. See id. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
106. See Robbins, supra note 21, at 556.
107. Id.
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not involve the same issues.""' Also, it should be noted that Justice
Rehnquist was the only Justice to arrive at his conclusion using the
nondelegation doctrine analysis, and he noted in Flagg Brothers, Inc.
v. Brooks"9 that "while many functions have been traditionally
performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved
to the State.' "I" Therefore, it is unlikely that outsourcing of prisons
poses any constitutional delegation problems under the analysis
proposed by Justice Rehnquist.
2. Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
The Supreme Court in Carter v. Carter Coal Co."' provided a
different analysis for delegation. Instead of applying the traditional
nondelegation doctrine preventing delegation of legislative functions,
the Court struck down a statute empowering coal producers and mine
workers to vote on hours and wages within their particular region
that would bind all employees." The majority described the statute
as "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for [it is a
delegation] ... to private persons whose interests may be and often
are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.""' 3 As a
result, the Court rejected the statute as an unconstitutional
delegation of power."4
The Court's concern about potential conflicts of interest for a
private party with governmental authority would be relevant to
private prisons if, for example, the prison management set prisoners'
release dates."5 Such authority, however, is maintained by the state
through both statutory and contractual provisions."6 It is also
108. Id. Presumably, though Robbins does not specifically state this, the statutory
guidelines would keep social policy in the hands of Congress.
109. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
110. Id. at 158.
111. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
112. See id. at 311; Froomkin, supra note 81, at 574. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), dealt specifically with the delegation of standardless
legislative authority to the president. See id. at 541-42. The Court rejected this
delegation of legislative power as being unconstitutional because of the lack of guidance
provided to the executive. See id. at 542. Carter Coal Co., while relying on Schechter as
precedent, dealt with the delegation of legislative authority to private parties (coal
producers and miners) and was more concerned with the conflicts of interest inherent in
such a delegation. See Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 311 (1936).
113. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 311.
114. See id.
115. Private prisons paid on a per prisoner basis have a financial interest in keeping
the prison occupied, thus tempting the prison operators to disfavor inmate releases. See
Ratliff, supra note 65, at 399-401.
116. Many states prohibit private prison operator involvement in computing good time
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important to recognize that "[t]he Carter Coal rationale has not ...
been used to invalidate any subsequent federal delegation to a
private group."'" 7 As a result, carefully written statutes providing
adequate government control and review of privately operated
prisons' policies and retaining legislative authority in the government
should prevent any conflicts with the nondelegation doctrine.
3. The Todd Test
As a result of the lack of cases applying the nondelegation
doctrine to private prisons, commentators have looked to cases
upholding the Maloney Act"8 to anticipate how the courts would
apply the doctrine.1 9 In Todd & Co. v. SEC,"' the Third Circuit
evaluated the constitutionality of the Maloney Act, considering three
requirements of the Act to be particularly relevant in upholding its
constitutionality: (1) any rules written by the private association
must be approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") prior to becoming enforceable; (2) the SEC must review and
make an independent decision on all private judgments of rule
violations and penalties; and (3) the SEC must make de novo findings
which may entail additional findings if necessary."' These factors can
be applied by analogy to the privatization of prisons. Enabling
legislation for private prisons should maintain rulemaking authority
or, at the least, rulemaking approval in a governmental agency
similar to the guidance provided by the Maloney Act." This would
credits. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(P) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-203(d) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 957.06(5) (West
1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.06(C)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 41-24-110(5) (1997).
117. Froomkin, supra note 81, at 575. Professor Froomkin hypothesizes that "[i]n a
world in which private police forces and private prisons are imaginable, if not yet
commonplace, if a nondelegation rule applies at all, it probably applies only to legislative
powers." Id.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994). The Maloney Act authorizes the self-regulation of the
securities industry, granting both regulatory and adjudicatory power over securities
markets to private securities associations. See id.
119. See Ratliff, supra note 65, at 392; Robbins, supra note 21, at 551-53; Ira P.
Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L.
REv. 911, 922-25 (1988). Professor Robbins also suggests that the Todd & Co. test may
be inapplicable to the private prison context because the Maloney Act and Todd & Co.
concern property interests not involved in private prison legislation. See Robbins, supra,
at 925; Robbins, supra note 21, at 553.
120. 557 F.2d 1008 (3rd Cir. 1977).
121. See id. at 1012.
122. See Robbins, supra note 21, at 552 (indicating that if a corrections agency made
the prison's rules of operation, then the first prong of the Todd & Co. test would be met).
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preclude prison corporations from promulgating self-serving rules.
Under the Todd & Co. test, the government also should maintain
authority over disciplinary matters related to prisoners. 123
Commentators have concluded that application of the Todd & Co.
test establishes that the delegation of prison authority is "not per se
unconstitutional"; however, the "private decision-making authority
must be subject to exacting government control."'12 4
The factors considered by the Third Circuit in its analysis can be
used as guidance in preparing enabling legislation in order to prevent
delegated authority from exceeding its constitutional scope. Statutes
clearly specifying the goals and authority of private prisons and
retaining authority over disciplinary proceedings in the state for
violations of prison rules should eliminate concerns related to the
nondelegation doctrine.
4. Nondelegation is a Nonissue
The current demands on governing bodies mandate delegation
of authority in order to maintain at least some limited efficiency." 5
The Ninth Circuit has stated, "[w]hile Congress cannot delegate to
private corporations or anyone else the power to enact laws, it may
employ them in an administrative capacity to carry them into
effect."' 26  Such "employment" is essential, for "[w]ithout the
delegation of subordinate rule-making (such as providing an
adequate number of security personnel in private prisons within a
statutorily established minimum), government would cease to
function at all, let alone efficiently."'2 7 Recognizing this situation, the
Supreme Court probably considers the nondelegation doctrine to be
a "dead letter."'" All that is required is an" 'intelligible principle'"
when Congress delegates legislative power. 29 In addition, the tests
and factors discussed in American Petroleum Institute, Carter, and
Todd & Co. imply that the nondelegation doctrine would not be
123. See id.
124. Ratliff, supra note 65, at 392; see Robbins, supra note 119, at 924-25.
125. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power,
and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 205, 243-44 (1997) (discussing the Supreme
Court's acceptance of delegation of government authority for efficiency).
126. Crain v. First Nat'l Bank, 324 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1963) (citing Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26,33 (1954)).
127. Dipiano, supra note 43, at 200.
128. Ratliff, supra note 65, at 383; see supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing
nondelegation as a virtually abandoned issue).
129. Robbins, supra note 21, at 546 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928)).
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violated by the delegation of authority to private prisons and may
possibly be wholly inapplicable because privatization does not
involve the delegation of any legislative authority constitutionally
vested in Congress. Under current enabling statutes, "[t]he operation
of a private for-profit prison would come under the delegation of
administrative powers [rather than legislative, law-making powers];
therefore it is unlikely that there would be serious grounds to
question the constitutionality of private prison management. '" 130
B. Applicability of Civil Rights Protection to Inmates in Private
Prisons
Assuming, then, that contracting with private industry to operate
prison facilities is not an unconstitutional delegation of authority, the
next relevant question is whether prisoners in private facilities will
benefit from the same constitutional protections offered to prisoners
in government-operated facilities. The civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, protects every person's rights, as provided by the Constitution
or statute .31  The protection provided by this statute extends to
inmates.132 Opponents of private prisons have voiced concerns that
private prisons will sacrifice prisoners' civil rights in pursuit of profit
without anyone being held accountable. 33 Although the operation of
prisons has been traditionally considered a state function, and private
prisons will be performing this function according to state regulations
and with state funding, an issue still remains as to whether private
prisons, "for constitutional purposes, will be treated as if they were
the state."" 4 One Supreme Court justice has acknowledged that "it is
130. SHICHOR, supra note 66, at 79.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 provides in part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
132. In 1989 alone, prisoners filed 18,389 civil rights suits in the federal courts. See
Joel, supra note 9, at 69.
133. See Brett R. Carter, Comment, Civil Rights-Richardson v. McKnight: The Rise
and Fall of Private Prison Guards' Qualified Immunity, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 611, 627-28
(1998) (explaining that the court in Manis v. Corrections Corp. of America, 859 F. Supp.
302 (M.D. Tenn. 1994), was concerned private prisons would skimp on civil rights in an
attempt to maximize profits); Ahlstrom, supra note 65, at 401-03 (discussing the Sixth
Circuit's concerns that private prison operators would not protect prisoners' civil rights).
134. Harold J. Sullivan, Privatization of Corrections: A Threat to Prisoners' Rights, in
PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 141.
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fair to say that 'our cases deciding when private action might be
deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency,' "135
and that in the private prison context the Court has recognized the
possibility that § 1983 is not applicable. 36
Persons who act "under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage" of any state may be held liable for a
civil rights violation under § 1983.137 Although the state may contract
with private parties, according to Professor Charles W. Thomas, a
private action does not constitute a state action as required by
§ 1983.138 However, the Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 39
determined that private parties as well as state officials can "'act
under color of law.' ,,4 A study of § 1983 cases involving private
contractors reveals that courts have consistently required "some type
or degree of linkage between private conduct and the state itself"; 4'
nevertheless, state funding or regulation of private agencies is
insufficient by itself to establish state action under § 1983.142
In Gomez v. Toledo, 43 the Supreme Court described the
elements of a § 1983 claim, explaining that a plaintiff must allege that
a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal
right.'" In determining whether conduct was performed under color
of state law, the Supreme Court has recognized three tests: (1) the
public functions test; (2) the close nexus test; and (3) the state
compulsion test. 45 The following paragraphs will discuss these tests
135. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (quoting
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
136. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2107 (1997) (observing that the
Court has not addressed "whether the defendants are liable under § 1983 even though
they are employed by a private firm"); see infra notes 343-59 and accompanying text
(discussing issues left open by the Court in McKnight).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
138. See Charles W. Thomas, Resolving the Problem of Qualified Immunity for Private
Defendants in Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits, 53 LA. L. REV. 449,451-52 (1992).
139. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
140. Id. at 152 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,794 (1966)).
141. Thomas, supra note 138, at 472.
142. See Sullivan, supra note 134, at 141 ("Generally, only those specific private
actions that are directly 'ordered' or 'initiated' by the state or in which state officials have
directly participated are subject to constitutional restraint.") (citing Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
143. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
144. See id. at 640 ("First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that
right acted under color of any state or territorial law.").
145. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (recognizing the
Court's use of the public function test, the close nexus test, and the state compulsion test).
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and their applicability to private prisons.
1. The Public Function Test
The public function test is arguably the most common-sense
approach to determining whether private action constitutes state
action because it provides that a party contracted to act for the state
is subject to the same legal constraints as the state.146 The public
function test focuses on the type of function being performed.
Applying the public function test, the Supreme Court in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn 47 explained that a private entity acts under color of
state law when it performs a function that "has been 'traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State.' "148 To resolve whether a private
actor meets the public function test, the principal role of the actor
must be reviewed to determine whether he is performing a public
function. If the private party's conduct is identified as a public
function, then for constitutional purposes, the private party is a state
actor in the eyes of the court. 49
A district court in Florida recently applied this analysis in
Blumel v. Mylander,50 stating that "when a government entity
delegates one of its traditional 'public functions' to a private entity,
the private entity may be held liable under the Constitution with
respect to its performance of that function." '' In Medina v.
The circuit courts have also recognized these tests. See, e.g., George v. Pacific-CSC Work
Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 746 (1997) (noting the
several tests used by courts); Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing the Court's use of the public function test, the close nexus test, and the state
compulsion test); Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382-83 (1983) (discussing several
tests used by the court to identify state action).
146. See Matthew M. Farley, Comment, Crashing the Party-The Supreme Court
Subjects Political Parties to Preclearance Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 191,247 (1997) (explaining
the public function test); Paul Ryneski, Civil Rights, 1996 DET. C.L. REV. 239, 254 (1996)
(same); William H. ReMine, Civil Suits for Civil Rights: A Primer on § 1983, 26 COLO.
LAW., Nov. 1997, at 5,6 (same).
147. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
148. Id. at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
The Supreme Court in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), further explained the public
function doctrine's application to § 1983 liability, noting that "when private individuals or
groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they
become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional
limitations." Id. at 299.
149. See Susan L. Kay, The Implications of Prison Privatization on the Conduct of
Prisoner Litigation Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983, 40 VAND. L. REV. 867, 880 (1987).
150. 919 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
151. Id. at 426-27.
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O'Neill,52 a Texas district court used the same analysis and held that
an untrained guard at a privately operated Immigration and
Naturalization Service facility acted under "color of law" when he
accidentally shot two inmates.153 The court stated that private
conduct is considered state action when a private contractor is
exercising authority "traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State." ' "154
Although the operation of incarceration facilities has historically
been performed by both private and public parties,'5 5  the
responsibility of incarcerating convicts falls squarely on the shoulders
of the government.5 6 Therefore, under the public function analysis,
prison management is a public function which, even when operated
by a private party, constitutes state action.157 As a result, under the
public function test, it is likely that a private corporation operating a
prison will be held responsible for maintaining prisoners'
constitutional rights under § 1983. The Sixth Circuit reached this
conclusion in Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc.,5 1 holding that a private prison
corporation's conduct under state contract was under color of law for
the purposes of § 1983.119 Because corrections and incarceration have
traditionally been a responsibility of the state, the public functions
doctrine has been recognized as "the most persuasive means of
finding that conduct of a private corrections firm constitutes state
action." 160
2. The Close Nexus Test
Similar to the public functions test, the close nexus test requires
152. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
153. See id. at 1038.
154. Id. (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoting
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,352 (1974))).
155. See supra notes 32-66 and accompanying text.
156. See SHICHOR, supra note 66, at 87; J. Robert Lilly & Richard A. Ball, Special
Comment, Selling Justice: Will Electronic Monitoring Last?, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 505, 518
(1993) (explaining that all 50 states as well as the District of Columbia and the federal
government have some incarceration responsibility); Douglas W. Dunham, Note, Inmates'
Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1482-83 (noting that
when the government incarcerates a person, it beconles responsible for his well-being).
157. Cf. Incata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that although prison health services was a private entity, state action was
present because the care of pre-trial detainees is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state).
158. 963 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1991).
159. See id. at 102.
160. Charles W. Thomas & Linda S. Calvert Hanson, The Implications of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for the Privatization of Prisons, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 933, 943 (1989).
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a close relationship between the conduct performed by the private
party and the state itself in order for that conduct to constitute state
action. For example, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,161 the
Supreme Court considered "whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself.""16  The close nexus test was used by the Tenth
Circuit in Milonas v. Williamsa63 to determine whether a school using
a behavior-modification program acted under color of state law
because "the state ha[d] so insinuated itself with the [school] as to be
considered a joint participant in the offending actions.""6 Four facts
were significant for the court in finding a close nexus: (1) the
involuntary nature of placement in the program by juvenile courts;
(2) the detailed contracts between the school administration and
local school districts; (3) the funding of tuition by the state; and (4)
the significant regulation of the school program by the state.165
Using the factors in Milonas, operators of private prisons are
likely to be subject to § 1983 liability under the close nexus test.
Although the Milonas case is not directly on point, the factors the
court considered may be applied by analogy to the private prison
context. Similar to the school in Milonas, placement in private
incarceration facilities is involuntary, and the private prisons receive
their funding from the state. In addition, private prisons are
operated under detailed contracts with the state and typically are
subject to extensive state regulation. 66 As a result, a sufficiently
close nexus exists between privately operated prisons and the state to
subject private operators to § 1983 liability.
3. The State Compulsion Test
The state compulsion test requires a relationship between the
conduct of a private party and the state in order to invoke § 1983
liability. Although not used as commonly as the other tests, the state
compulsion test was recognized by the Supreme Court in Lugar v.
161. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
162. Id. at 351.
163. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
164. Id. at 940.
165. See id; see also Woodall v. Partilla, 581 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (using
the close nexus test to determine that a private food corporation acted under color of
law); Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Conn, 510 F. Supp. 1233, 1250 (W.D. Ky.
1980) (finding sufficient close nexus between private residential-treatment center and
state), aff'd, 674 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1982).
166. See Robbins, supra note 12, at 821.
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Edmundson Oil Co. 67 This test "requires that a state exercise such
coercive power or provide such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that in law the choice of the private actor is deemed
to be that of the state.' 16
In addition to the Supreme Court, several lower courts have
recognized and applied the state compulsion test to determine
whether private conduct constitutes state action.69  In Lombard v.
Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center,y0 a district court faced the question
of whether the Shriver Center, a privately-operated facility that
contracted to provide medical services to a school's residents, was
liable for a § 1983 claim.'' The Lombard court explained the state
compulsion test's "general principle that private entities act under
color of law only if their actions are compelled by rules of decisions
imposed by the state.' ' 72  The test as used in Lombard seems
particularly relevant in the private prison context since the Lombard
court found the critical factor to be "the duty of the state to provide
adequate medical services to those whose personal freedom is
restricted because they reside in state institutions."'' Involuntary
confinement in school is analogous to involuntary detainment faced
by inmates in private prisons. The court in Lombard was concerned
that if the private facility was not held responsible for violations of
constitutional rights, "the state could avoid its constitutional
obligations simply by delegating governmental functions to private
entities."' 74 Similarly, the State is compelled to operate prisons in
order to house inmates. The same concerns regarding the state's
ability to delegate government functions and constitutional
167. 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982). The Supreme Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970), used a similar analysis to hold that a private party acting jointly with the
state or a state agent can be liable for violating the guaranteed protection of
constitutional rights under § 1983. See id. at 152. The Adickes Court held that" '[t]o act
"under color" of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is
enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,794 (1966)).
168. Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992).
169. See George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1996);
Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335 (recognizing the applicability of the state compulsion test).
170. 556 F. Supp. 677 (D. Mass. 1983).
171. See id. at 677-78.
172. Id. at 680. The Lombard opinion then discussed other possible reasons for
private action to be considered "state action," holding that "because Shriver voluntarily
assumed that obligation [of mandated State medical care] by contract, Shriver must be
considered to have acted under color of law, and its acts and omissions must be
considered actions of the state." Id.
173. Id at 678.
174. Id. at 680.
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responsibilities exist in the private prison context. Therefore,
operators of private prison facilities are likely to be actors under
color of law. Consequently, private prison operators should be
responsible for the same constitutional obligations to protect
prisoners' rights that the state would be in managing a government-
operated prison.
4. Section 1983 Likely is Applicable
In order to make the private prison experiment successful and to
ease opponents' fears, "[p]risoners confined in private facilities will
have to retain the same legal rights as inmates have in public
facilities."175 While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
whether private prison corporations act under color of law in
managing prison facilities, it seems likely, given the tests used to
establish "state action," that the constitutional rights of prisoners in
private prisons will be protected by § 1983. The fact that private
prisons are not publicly operated does little to render the civil rights
statute inapplicable as long as the employees are found to be
operating under color of state law. Although a private contractor is
not equivalent to a state official, in performing the state function of
incarceration, a private contractor likely acts under color of state law.
No matter which test a court uses to determine state action,
application of all three tests leads to the same conclusion: Private
prison operators act under color of state law and should be
responsible for protecting prisoners' constitutional rights.176
C. Applicability of Qualified Immunity to Private Prison Employees
Once the requirement of state action is met and a constitutional
violation has occurred, the next question is whether qualified
immunity exists. Originally, the concept of immunity stemmed from
175. SHICHOR, supra note 66, at 108. The district court in Plain v. Flicker, 645 F. Supp.
898 (D.N.J. 1986), hypothesized that "if a state contracted with a private corporation to
run its prisons [the state] would no doubt subject the private prison employees to § 1983
suits under the public function doctrine." Id. at 907.
176. See SHICHOR, supra note 66, at 87. Shichor concluded that:
(a) the state delegates to the private operators of prisons a power that was
traditionally (at least in' the 20th century) in the exclusive domain of state
authorities; (b) based on several court decisions, there can be a close nexus
established between the actions of a private party operating a prison and the
state; and (c) court decisions also indicate that the state does have an obligation
to provide certain specific services, (including incarceration of offenders), and, if
a private entity under contract with the state provides these services, then the
state is responsible for them.
Id. (citing Robbins, supra note 21, at 593).
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the premise that" 'the king can do no wrong,' "177 and, therefore, was
only applicable to government officials; however, due to policy and
efficiency concerns, the application of immunity has been gradually
extended. 78 In its text, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "creates a species of tort
liability that on its face admits of no immunities."'17 9 Even though
immunity is not explicitly allowed by § 1983, courts have recognized
qualified immunity under certain circumstances.' The following
section reviews some of the methods the courts have applied to
determine whether to grant immunity, specifically discussing the
courts' use of tradition, function, and policy and fairness concerns.'8'
This section then discusses the Supreme Court's first decision related
to the extension of immunity to a private party in Wyatt v. Cole,"2
followed by a discussion of how the circuit courts have inconsistently
dealt with immunity in the private prison context. 3  Next, this
section analyzes the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Richardson v.
McKnight,'84 which held that immunity should not be granted to
private prison employees."s  Questions left open by the majority
opinion are also reviewed. It is proposed that immunity should be
extended to private prison employees, as doing so is in the public's
interest. 8 6 Alternatively, a good-faith defense limiting private prison
guard liability is suggested.Y7
1. Methods of Determining Applicability of Immunity
The following section reviews several of the factors, approaches,
177. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131
(5th ed. 1984). However, it has also been asserted that this maxim "actually meant that
the King was not privileged" to commit any wrongful acts. Edwin M. Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 n.2 (1924).
178. See Schaffer, supra note 59, at 1063-68 (explaining policy reasons for the
extension of immunity),
179. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). The Supreme Court in Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), further explained that the language of § 1983 is
"absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses
that may be asserted." Owen, 445 U.S. at 635.
180. See Thomas, supra note 138, at 462. Professor Thomas notes that a strong
argument against qualified immunity can also be made, however. See id. at 462-63.
181. See infra notes 188-229 and accompanying text.
182. 504 U.S. 158 (1992). For the discussion of this case, see infra notes 230-49 and
accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 250-74 and accompanying text.
184. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
185. See infra notes 275-312 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's
opinion).
186. See infra notes 338-42 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 348-59 and accompanying text.
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and tests that courts have employed in granting or rejecting
immunity.
a. Tradition as a Basis for Extending Immunity
Some courts have used tradition as a guide in extending
immunity to private parties. While § 1983 does not expressly provide
immunity to constitutional violations, the Supreme Court in
Procunier v. Navarette8 8 and Harlow v. Fitzgerald89 noted that the
absence of the immunity doctrine from the statute does not preclude
immunity's existence. 19 In Owen v. City of Independence,9' the
Court rejected the extension of immunity to a municipal corporation
due to the lack of traditional extension of immunity under similar
circumstances. 192 In doing so, the Court held that the extension of
§ 1983 immunity could only occur when the "tradition of immunity
was so fairly rooted in the common law and was supported by such
strong policy reasons that 'Congress would have specifically so
provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.' ,,i9 Thus, the Owen
Court relied on the absence of any common law tradition of
extending immunity to corporate municipalities. 194 It is important to
note, however, that tradition has typically been simply a factor to be
considered in the extension of immunity, with function and public
policy playing important roles in the final decision of whether to
188. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
189. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
190. See Procunier, 434 U.S. at 561; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-08; supra notes 210-14,
216 and accompanying text (discussing Harlow).
191. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
192 See id. at 638. In Owen, the corporate municipality, through its employees,
released false statements related to the police chief's character, resulting in his discharge.
See id. at 625-29. The police chief successfully argued at the district court level that this
action violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and § 1983. See id. at
630. The municipality claimed immunity from such suits, but the Supreme Court rejected
this assertion. See id. at 632-38.
193. Id. at 637 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,555 (1967)).
194. See id. In Pierson, the Supreme Court held that absolute immunity traditionally
provided to judges was not precluded by the enactment of § 1983, noting that "[f]ew
doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from
liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction." Pierson, 386
U.S. at 553-554. After tracing legislative privilege back to 16th century English common
law, the Court in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), confirmed that § 1983 did not
eliminate legislative immunity and concluded that Congress "would [not] impinge on a
tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general
language" of § 1983. Id. at 376. In addition, the Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976), determined that immunities to § 1983 are "predicated upon a considered
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and
the interests behind it." Id. at 421.
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grant or deny immunity.
Although history and tradition are considerations for the Court
in determining the applicability of immunity, they should be of
minimal relevance in the private prison context because private
parties historically could not be held in violation of an individual's
civil rights since they were not considered state actors. Courts,
however, have since liberally expanded constitutional responsibility
to private individuals.95 Expanding the scope of civil remedies while
continuing to use analyses based on history "places private
defendants in an impossible position."'96 In the interest of equity,
immunity should be expanded in accord with the extension of liability
that has been placed on private parties conducting "state action."'"
b. The Functional Approach
A review of the traditional common law tests for the extension
of immunity reveals that courts often use a functional test when
considering whether to grant immunity.'98 The Supreme Court has
explained the functional approach as one in which it examines "the
nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of
officials has been lawfully entrusted and... evaluate[s] the effect that
exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the
appropriate exercise of those functions."'99  Commentators and
courts have both supported this approach for determining when
parties should be allowed an immunity exception to § 1983 liability.2 °0
195. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); supra note 144 and accompanying
text (explaining that private parties cannot be held in violation of an individual's civil
rights unless they act under color of state law); see also Thomas, supra note 138, at 487
(explaining that in the post-Monroe era, judicial decisions expanded the group of § 1983
plaintiffs to include private parties). Alternately, if tradition is relevant to the extension
of immunity in the private prison context, Justice Scalia suggests that a functional
approach traditionally is used to determine whether immunity should be granted;
therefore, private prison guards should be granted the same immunity as their public
counterparts. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2108-09 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
196. Thomas, supra note 138, at 487.
197. "[Considerations of simple fairness and equity recommend immunity when the
alleged deprivations involve a constitutional right that was not clearly recognized at the
time of the alleged misconduct." Id. at 492.
198. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) ("Running through our
cases, with fair consistency, is a 'functional' approach to immunity questions.").
199. Id.
200. Commentators have argued that the availability of immunity should be based on
a functional approach rather than a historical or exclusively governmental approach. See
Thomas, supra note 138, at 459 (noting "the availability of either absolute or qualified
immunity from damage suits flows in large measure from the function of the officials
whose acts are said to have been the causes of injuries rather than from the positions they
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In recognizing government immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes,"1 the
Supreme Court applied a functional analysis. 2 The Court explained
that the purpose of the immunity was to protect persons who are
"required, by the legal obligations of [their] position[s], to exercise
discretion" from being subjected to liability and to avoid the threat
that such liability would "deter [their] willingness to execute [their]
office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good."2 3 Simply put, the Court recognized that immunity flows from
the undesirability of placing those charged with execution of
government policies in the untenable position of being required to
exercise discretion while at the same time exposing themselves to
personal liability for discretionary acts they reasonably believe are
lawful.2" As a result, the Court extended immunity so that the risk of
liability would not deter people from serving the public interest.20 5
The Court in Cleavinger v. Saxne' 06 repeated this sentiment, holding
that "immunity flows not from rank or title or 'location within the
government,' but from the nature of the responsibilities of the
individual official. 2 7 In Forrester v. White,0 3 the Court went even
further in establishing the functional approach to qualified immunity,
stating that "immunity is justified and defined by the functions it
protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches. 209
The application of the functional approach to private prison
employees should require an extension of immunity. Private prison
employees serve the same function as public prison employees. As a
result, private prison employees are required to exercise the same
hold."); Schaffer, supra note 59, at 1056-58 (discussing the functional approach to
application of immunity); Ahlstrom, supra note 65, at 385-86 (arguing that a functional
approach to granting immunity should be taken by courts). The Supreme Court also has
used this analysis. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 644-46 (1987); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1983). In Warner v.
Grand County, 57 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit applied the functional
approach to private individuals, holding that "a private individual who performs a
government function pursuant to a state order or request is entitled to qualified immunity
if a state official would have been entitled to such immunity." Id. at 967.
201. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
202. See id. at 243.
203. Id. at 240.
204. See id. at 239-42; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 (extending government
immunity to officials required to perform discretionary functions); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (same).
205. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
206. 474 U.S. 193 (1985).
207. Id. at 201 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,511 (1978)).
208. 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
209. Id. at 226.
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discretion as their public prison counterparts in an attempt to comply
with legal requirements, performance standards, and public interest.
Therefore, the same immunity that is granted to government
employees at public prisons should be extended to private employees
under the functional approach.
c. Policy and Fairness Considerations
In addition to tradition and function, the courts also consider
policy concerns related to the extension of immunity. In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,210 the Supreme Court took policy concerns into
consideration in granting a presidential aide qualified immunity.'
Specifically, the Harlow Court feared that liability would deter
independent decisionmaking by government officials. In addition,
the Court found it to be in the public's best interest to reduce the cost
of defending § 1983 immunity claims2 13 by using immunity to quickly
eliminate insubstantial claims. 14
In Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore,2 15 the Fifth Circuit followed
a similar analysis in determining that a party acting under color of
state law was entitled to immunity from liability under § 1983.216
Kenneth Scullin filed a § 1983 claim against Max Moore, Julian
Holiday, and Tom Burns, who had relied on an attachment statute
which allowed them to execute a judgment against Scullin's
property.217 In response to Scullin's § 1983 claim and his argument
that the attachment statute was unconstitutional, the district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants because these issues
had already been litigated.2 18 However, the Fifth Circuit reversed
and proceeded to consider Scullin's § 1983 claim 19  After
determining that persons relying on state attachment statutes to
execute a judgment against a defendant's property were acting under
color of state law, the court weighed policy and fairness concerns and
210. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
211. See icL at 813-14; supra notes 210-14 (discussing Harlow).
212. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
213. See id. The costs, both individual and societal, include "the expense of litigation;
the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues; the deterrence of able citizens
from acceptance of public office; [and the chilling effect on] the discharge of official
duties." Id.; see 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAW OF § 1983, § 8:5, at 8-16 (4th ed. 1997).
214. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
215. 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982).
216. See id. at 1037 (relying on Harlow, 457 U.S. 800).
217. See id. at 1034.
218. See id. at 1034-35.
219. See id. at 1036.
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decided the defendants had qualified immunity from the § 1983
claim.' °
Many of the same policy and fairness concerns that support
granting immunity to employees in the public sector also support an
extension of immunity to private prison employees. For example,
prisoners have a great incentive to file numerous claims against the
state. Judge Reavley has pointed out that "[u]nlike most litigants,
prisoners have everything to gain and nothing to lose by filing
frivolous suits" because the financial as well as the opportunity costs
of filing a suit in forma pauperis are minimal to a prisoner, and
sanctions for malicious or frivolous claims or perjury have little if any
deterrent effect on prisoners already serving time.22 1 Judge Reavley's
argument is supported by the extraordinary number of claims filed by
prisoners each year. In 1993, 53,451 prisoner suits were filed in the
United States.m2 Of course, not all claims filed by prisoners are
frivolous; however, one commentator has estimated that frivolous
law suits filed by prisoners cost society $200 million annually.22
These statistics, as well as court decisions considering policy
concerns, indicate the relevance of fairness as a consideration for the
extension of immunity.2 4 Logic and fairness support granting
immunity to private prison officials in the same manner it is extended
to public prison officials.m Extending identical immunities to
private-prison operators would create a "flat playing field" on which
publicly and privately-managed prison facilities can compete.226 With
the extraordinary number of prisoner lawsuits and the corresponding
costs,17 it would be an unfair cost advantage to provide the public
sector with a qualified immunity not available to its private
counterparts.' As the following section indicates, however, the
220. See id.
221. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1986).
222 See Robert G. Doumar, Prisoner Cases: Feeding the Monster in the Judicial
Closet, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 21,23 tbl.1 (1994).
223. See Ahlstrom, supra note 65, at 419. This student commentator arrived at this
figure by extrapolating from a $100 million estimate made by another scholar in 1986. See
id. (citing Roger A. Hanson, What Should Be Done When Prisoners Want to Take the State
to Court?, 70 JUDICATURE 223, 225 (1987)). Ahistrom figured that since the state and
federal prison populations have doubled since 1986, then the annual cost of law suits has
also doubled. See id. at 419 & n.170.
224. The Supreme Court in Harlow recognized fairness and policy concerns. See supra
notes 212-13 (discussing policy concerns considered by Harlow Court).
225. Thomas, supra note 138, at 452.
226. Id. at 454.
227. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of frivolous
litigation).
228. See Thomas, supra note 138, at 454.
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Supreme Court has limited the importance of fairness, determining
that fairness cannot be the only or even the primary supporting
rationale for granting immunity. 9
2. The Rejection of Private Party Immunity in Wyatt v. Cole
In 1992, in Wyatt v. Cole,2" the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether private parties could enjoy the benefits of qualified
immunity from § 1983.31 The parties in Wyatt were two ranchers who
had formed a partnership. 2 Bill Cole, one of the ranchers, wished to
dissolve his partnership with Howard Wyatt. 3 Unable to reach an
agreement with Wyatt, Cole filed a complaint in replevin against
Wyatt in accordance with a Mississippi statute. 4 By court order,
Cole seized twenty-four head of cattle, a tractor, and other property
from Wyatt.3 After a post-seizure hearing dismissing Cole's
complaint, Cole refused to return the property to Wyatt, at which
time Wyatt brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the
Mississippi replevin statute and claiming damages under § 1983 for a
violation of his constitutional right to due process 36 The district
court concluded that the statute's failure to afford judges discretion
in denying writs of replevin violated due process and was therefore
unconstitutional; however, the court determined that Cole was
entitled to qualified immunity. 7  The district court only granted
partial summary judgment for Wyatt by declaring the statute
unconstitutional3 8 The judge ordered Wyatt to submit a motion
detailing his claim and the amount of damages he was seeking. 39 In
response to this motion, the judge dismissed the claims against the
county and other defendants.24 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
holding that Cole had immunity from the § 1983 claim.24'
The Supreme Court, though, came to the opposite conclusion.242
229. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
230. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
231. See id. at 159.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 159-60.
235. See id. at 160.
236. See id.
237. See Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180, 182-83 (S.D. Miss. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd
and remanded in part, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
238. See id. at 183.
239. See id.
240. See Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718,720 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
241. See id. at 721-22.
242. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168 (1992).
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The Court recognized an inconsistency among the circuit courts
regarding granting immunity to private parties,243 and determined
that a qualified immunity should only be granted if the immunity was
so well recognized that the statute would have specifically precluded
the immunity if it intended to eliminate it.' To determine if such an
immunity existed at common law prior to the enactment of § 1983,
the Wyatt Court looked to the torts it found to be most analogous:
malicious prosecution and abuse of process.2 45 Within this class of
cases, the Court did not find substantial support for a traditionally
provided immunity to private parties.246 As a result the Court
concluded that "the nexus between private parties and the historic
purposes of qualified immunity is simply too attenuated to justify ...
an extension of ... immunity. 2 47 The Court then addressed the
policy concerns involved in extending immunity and distinguished
government officials from private parties performing discretionary
functions by explaining that "the public interest will not be unduly
impaired if private individuals are required to proceed to trial to
resolve their legal disputes.""24 The legal issue answered by Wyatt,
however, was admittedly narrow, dealing exclusively with private
parties invoking a state replevin, garnishment, or attachment
statute.249 Therefore, Wyatt is conceivably inapplicable to the context
of private prison employees acting under color of state law.
3. The Courts' Treatment of Immunity with Private Prisons
Several courts have specifically considered the extension of
qualified immunity in private prison settings with mixed results. 5 Of
the three district courts that have directly considered whether
equivalent immunities should be granted to private prison
employees, one court denied immunity251 and two other courts
granted the immunity to private prison employees. z In 1997, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether private prison
243. See id. at 161.
244. Id. at 163-64 (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980)
(quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967))).
245. See id at 164.
246. See id. at 165.
247. Id. at 168.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 168-69.
250. See Citrano v. Allen Correctional Ctr., 891 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. La. 1995); Manis V.
Corrections Corp. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Tinnen v. Corrections
Corp. of Am., No. 91-2188-TUA, 1993 WL 738121 (W.D. Tenn., Sept. 20, 1993).
251. See Manis, 859 F. Supp. at 303.
252. See Citrano, 891 F.Supp. at 320; Ylinnen, 1993 WL 738121, at *4.
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employees should be granted immunity in Richardson v. McKnight. 3
The following section explains the district court decisions254 and
reviews the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in McKnight. Finally, the
section concludes by explaining that a decision recognizing immunity
for private prison employees would be more effective in encouraging
private prison experimentation and that such a decision would still
meet the policy concerns of McKnight.'
a. Treatment of Private Prison Immunity Issues by Lower
Courts
Manis v. Corrections Corporation of Americall provides one
example of how federal district courts have resolved the immunity
question. In Manis, the district court ignored the functional approach
commonly used in questions of immunity157 and held that private
prison employees are not subject to the same immunity as employees
in government-operated prisons." The court based its decision on
both the lack of historical support for immunity of private prison
officials as well as policy concerns related to providing such immunity
in a profit-motivated settingl 9 The court feared that private prisons
would neglect prisoners' rights in pursuit of increased profits,260 and
expressed concern that "'a private party is governed only by self-
interest and is not invested with the responsibility of executing the
duties of a public official in the public interest.' "261
Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center262 directly rebutted many of
the concerns of the Manis court and arrived at a different conclusion
253. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
254. See infra notes 256-74 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 338-42 and accompanying text.
256. 859 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
257. See supra notes 198-209 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of a
functionality test for applying immunity).
258. See Manis, 859 F. Supp. at 303.
259. See id. at 304 (relying on Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir. 1988)).
260. See id. at 305-06. The court concluded that "corporate employees always are
compelled to make decisions that will benefit their shareholders, without any direct
consideration for the best interest of the public." Id. at 305. One commentator
explained, "[E]mployees of a private prison corporation are responsible to produce profit
for their company and owe their direct responsibility to the management of the company.
They do not have to answer to the public at large as do state employees ...." SHICHOR,
supra note 66, at 97; see also Kay, supra note 149, at 887 ("A defense of qualified
immunity, if awarded to ... private employees, might encourage them to cut comers to
maximize profits.").
261. Manis, 859 F. Supp. at 887 (quoting Duncan, 844 F.2d. at 1264).
262. 891 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. La. 1995).
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regarding immunity.263 Using Procunier v. Navarette264 for guidance,
the Citrano court explained the rationale behind providing state
prison officials with qualified immunity and focused on two key
components as reasons for extension of immunity: (1) the fact that a
private party is performing a government function under contract
with the State; and (2) the danger that lack of immunity would deter
the private sector from contracting for public jobs.2 65 The Citrano
court took additional guidance from Scheuer v. Rhodes, 266 recognizing
the consistent use of the "functional approach in determining the
proper scope of immunity. '267 As a result, the court concluded that
the granting of qualified immunity should be based on the function
being performed.2 68 The employee's private party status should not
be the controlling consideration 69
The court also explained that Wyatt did not mandate a denial of
qualified immunity to all private parties.270 Rejecting the Manis
argument that immunity should not be extended to private prisons
due to the likelihood that the immunity would be abused in pursuit of
profit, the Citrano court said public officials are not granted
immunity because it is assumed that they are "subjectively motivated
by desire to serve public interests."271 Instead, the rationale is that
they can better serve the public interest if they can exercise their
public duties without the fear of being sued.272 Therefore, because
private prison employees "are the functional equivalent of state
prison employees ... the same rationale[]" applies, and immunity
should be extended.273 A Tennessee district court followed a similar
rationale in granting qualified immunity to private prison officials.274
263. See id. at 318-20.
264. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
265. See Citrano, 891 F. Supp. at 316.
266. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
267. Citrano, 891 F. Supp. at 316.
268. Id. (noting that because the private employees were the equivalent of state prison
employees who are provided with immunity, the same rationales for granting immunity
exist).
269. See id.
270. See id. at 317.
271. Id. at 319.
272. See id.
273. Id. at 317. "The mere fact that [private and public prison officials'] contractual
ties to the state are different does not provide a logical basis for denying these workers
the benefit of qualified immunity." Id. In Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983),
the Eighth Circuit used this argument, holding that "it would be anomalous to hold that
private individuals are state actors [under] § 1983" but then prohibit them the use of the
immunity "because they technically are not state employees." Id. at 851.
274. See Tinnen v. Corrections Corp. of America, No. 91-2188-TVA, 1993 WL 738121,
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b. Richardson v. McKnight
Richardson v. McKnighti75 offered the Supreme Court an
opportunity to answer some questions that had been inconsistently
dealt with by the lower courts.276 In McKnight, the plaintiff, Ronnie
Lee McKnight, alleged that two private prison guards had violated
his constitutional rights by seriously injuring him with restraints2 7
The defendants, Darryl Richardson and John Walker, claimed they
had qualified immunity from § 1983 liability as provided by
Harlow.278 The Sixth Circuit held that because the defendants were
employed by a private corporation rather than the state, the rationale
for granting the qualified immunity in Harlow was inapplicable;27 9
therefore, the court rejected Richardson and Walker's immunity
defense." ° Recognizing discrepancies in the way similar cases had
been handled by other courts, the Sixth Circuit focused on public
policy reasons in concluding that privately employed prison guards
were not entitled to the immunity provided their governmental
counterparts.28 The Sixth Circuit's concern that "privately employed
prison officials would be prone to infringe on prisoners' rights in
order to maximize profits" guided the decision.M2
i. The Supreme Court's Two-Pronged Analysis
In McKnight, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a 5-4
decision affirmed the circuit court's decision.283 The Court identified
Wyatt as the relevant precedent for deciding whether qualified
at *4 (W.D. Tenn., Sept. 20, 1993).
275. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
276. See supra 250-74 and accompanying text (discussing contradictory decisions in the
district courts). Some courts have revealed a willingness to extend immunity to private
parties, others indicate that qualified immunity only applies to public officials, and then
others draw a less distinguishable line, providing qualified immunity to public officials and
a good-faith defense for private persons. See Thomas, supra note 138, at 452-53. The
McKnight Court recognized the discrepancy in the ways courts have extended immunities
to private parties. See McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2102 (citing Eagon v. Elk City, 72 F.3d
1480, 1489-90 (10th Cir. 1996)); Williams v. O'Leary, 55 F.3d 320, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1995);
Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 928-29 (1st Cir. 1992)).
277. See McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2102.
278. See id; supra notes 210-14 (discussing Harlow).
279. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 423-24 (6th Cir. 1996), affd sub nom.
Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1998).
280. See id at 424.
281. See id. at 424-25.
282. Ahlstrom, supra note 65, at 385.
283. See McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2102-03. Justice Breyer was joined in the majority
opinion by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. See id. at 2102.
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immunity should be extended to private parties.' 4 Reviewing Wyatt,
the majority recognized § 1983's goal of deterring " 'state actors from
using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their
federally guaranteed rights.' "' The Court then addressed the
source of immunity.26 Although the Supreme Court has a history of
granting immunity on a functional basis,2 7 the majority instead
applied a two-pronged analysis, considering whether immunity had
historically been granted under the circumstances of the case and
whether policy supported granting such immunity. 8
In addressing the historical prong of the test, the majority
concluded that "[h]istory does not reveal a 'firmly rooted' tradition of
immunity applicable to privately employed prison guards." 9
Although earlier courts placed minimal weight on the historical
prong,290 the majority emphasized the absence of precedent that
granted immunity to private prison employees.291 The Court noted
that prison guards in public prisons historically have been the
beneficiaries of some form of qualified immunity arising out of their
status as public employees, but that the same benefit traditionally has
not been extended to private employees. 292 After a short review of
the history of private prisons, the majority noted that even the
common law did not extend qualified immunity to private prison
officials who mistreated prisoners.293 Although courts have provided
immunity for some private defendants, including doctors, social
workers, and private guards performing under the government's
order,294 the majority found "no indication of any more general
284. See id. at 2103.
285. Id. (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158,161 (1992)).
286. See i&.
287. See supra notes 198-209 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of a
functional approach to granting immunity).
288. See McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2104,2106. "The Wyatt majority, in deciding whether
or not the private defendants enjoyed immunity looked both to history and to 'the special
policy concerns involved in suing government officials.'" Id. at 2102 (quoting Wyatt, 504
U.S. at 167).
289. 1& at 2104.
290. See Thomas, supra note 138, at 487-88.
291. See McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2104.
292. See id.
293. See id. The Court cited several cases that awarded prisoners recovery against
private companies leasing prison facilities and prison labor, each of which failed to
address the possibility of granting immunity to the private employees involved. See id.
(citing Boswell v. Barnhart, 23 S.E. 414, 415 (Ga. 1895); Dalheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225,
228-230 (C.C.D. Minn. 1891); Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 10 S.E. 435,435-36 (Ga. 1889)).
294. See Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 963 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting
immunity to a private citizen and a dispatcher who conducted a strip search under orders
from a state employee); Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 405 (7th
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immunity that might have applied to private individuals working for
profit."295  The majority therefore concluded that the lack of a
historical immunity for employees and operators of private prisons
militated against granting immunity in the circumstances offered in
McKnight.296
Although the majority in McKnight concluded that the extension
of immunity failed the historical test, the Court said that it was a
closer question as to whether the policy underlying immunity
justified granting it to private prison guards.297 In addressing the
policy considerations, the Court declared that the purpose of
immunity, as defined by Wyatt, is to protect government officials'
abilities to perform discretionary functions and to limit the deterrent
effect that potential liability may have on public sector job
applicants.298 The Court feared that threats of liability would deter
public officials from taking discretionary action.299 The majority then
rejected the defendants' claim that the goals of immunity supported
granting private prison guards immunity, basing its decision on three
distinct policy factors: market pressure, availability of insurance, and
insufficiency of using the potential distraction of litigation to prompt
a need for immunity.3"
First, private officials will not face the same "unwarranted
timidity" that public officials face because economic, contract, and
statutory motivation encourage private officials to "do both a safer
and a more effective job" in order to avoid potential damage and
litigation expenses that would reduce profitability."' The majority
distinguished the incentives available in the private and public sector
by stating that public facility employees work under a system
responsible to voters, who rarely consider the performance of civil
servants, such as prison guards, when they vote.3 ~ In addition, civil
service rules protecting employee job security limit government
Cir. 1993) (granting immunity to private doctor and hospital that provided medication to
a patient pursuant to a court order); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 928-29 (1st Cir. 1992)
(extending immunity to private social workers under contract with the government who
were performing a job traditionally performed by a public employee).
295. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2105.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 2106-07.
301. Id. at 2106. Under this analysis, the majority concluded "marketplace pressures
provide the private firm with strong incentives to avoid overly timid, insufficiently
vigorous, unduly fearful, or 'non-arduous' employee job performance." Id. at 2106-07.
302. See id. at 2107.
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employers' ability to use termination or compensation as
incentives. 3 The majority therefore concluded that immunity is
unnecessary in the context of private prison employees because profit
incentives alone provide a great motivation for employees to perform
their jobs vigorously and use the required discretion. 4
Second, the Court determined that the availability of insurance,
which is often required by statute, refuted the argument for
immunity. 05 The majority reasoned that the availability and use of
insurance makes it more likely that a private party will be
indemnified, limiting the deterrent effect of potential liability to job
applicants.3 16 In addition, privately-operated facilities may "offset
any increased employee liability risk with higher pay or extra
benefits" and eliminate the "employment-discouraging fear of
unwarranted liability potential applicants face" when accepting a
public sector job. 7
The final argument rejected by the majority was that litigation
may distract the private contractor from fulfilling its obligations.3 03
The majority determined that this concern alone was insufficient
grounds for granting immunity primarily because qualified immunity
precedent did not "contemplate" that all "lawsuit-based distractions"
would be eliminated.3 0 9  The majority also noted that the state
reserved certain discretionary decisions for state officials, such as
"those related to prison discipline, to parole, and to good time,"
thereby taking away some of the discretion that would submit them
to the threat of litigation.310 Since the private prison's tasks were not
that different from other public tasks performed by private
companies, the Court decided that the threat of litigation was not a
sufficient justification for extending immunity to prison employees.311
Thus, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit decision. 12
ii. The McKnight Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, dissented, reasoning that the same rationales
303. See id.
304. See id at 2106-07.
305. See id. at 2107.
306. See id. at 2106.
307. Id.
30& See id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 2108.
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that support providing government officials with immunity from
§ 1983 also support granting immunity to private employees
performing government functions.313 Although Justice Scalia agreed
with the use of a historical analysis in determining whether immunity
was abolished by the enactment of § 1983, he criticized the majority's
conclusion for its reliance on the absence of a case providing
immunity rather than on an express rejection of qualified immunity
for private prison employees. 4 Justice Scalia pointed out that "it is
irrational, and productive of harmful policy consequences, to rely
upon lack of case support to create an artificial limitation upon the
scope of a doctrine (prison guard immunity) that was itself not based
on case-support. 315 Citing Williams v. Adams,31 6 decided before the
enactment of § 1983, Justice Scalia concluded that more case law
supports granting immunity in the private prison context than for
public prison officials. 7
Justice Scalia's historical analysis focused on the two principles
that courts have traditionally relied upon in granting immunity: (1)
"Immunity is determined by function, not status, and (2) ... private
status is not disqualifying. ' '318 Applying this functional approach, the
dissent contended that the incarceration of inmates was a
government function that merited qualified immunity.319 In support
of this conclusion, Justice Scalia offered the fact that private
individuals regularly have been granted immunity in performance of
traditional government functions. In this case, the defendants
perform a traditional government function deserving of qualified
immunity; therefore, the same immunity granted to public prison
employees should be extended to private guards.321
313. See id. at 2108-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
314. See id. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Pointing out the flaw in the majority's
reliance on the absence of direct common law support of immunity for private prison
employees, Justice Scalia noted that "[t]he [majority] observes that private jailers existed
in the 19th century, and that they were successfully sued by prisoners. But one could just
as easily show that government-employed jailers were successfully sued at common law,
often with no mention of possible immunity." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
315. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. 85 Mass. (3 Allen 16) 171 (1861).
317. See McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
318. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
319. See id. at 2110 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The courts have provided immunity for individuals
acting in grand juries and as witnesses regardless of whether they were government
employees. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335
(1983); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)).
321. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia found the majority's policy argument to be not
only irrelevant, since "history and not judicially analyzed policy
governs this matter," but also inaccurate.32 He first addressed the
majority's belief that market pressures applicable to private prisons
eliminate the need for immunity of private prison employees, finding
two errors with this argument. 23  First, decisions related to
privatizing prisons are not made under market circumstances because
it is "a government decision, not a market choice. ' 324  Second,
assuming the political arena is cost-conscious in its decisionmaking,
the decision to privatize will be dominated by price rather than
value.3  Therefore, because a contractor's price is directly related to
expenses, including the costs of defending § 1983 suits, corporate
operators of prisons attempting to maintain competitive prices will be
reluctant to allow employees to use the force which their public
counterparts may use without fear of liability.326 Based on these
assumptions, the dissent concluded that "private prison managers
have even greater need than civil-service prison managers for
immunity as an incentive to discipline. '327
The dissent then rejected the majority's argument that the
presence of insurance in the private sector eliminates the deterrent
effect of § 1983 claims.328 The dissent pointed out that civil rights
liability insurance also is available for public entities.32 9 It also
disregarded the majority's argument that salary and benefit
incentives unavailable to government entities may be used by private
corporations to overcome the deterrent effect of § 1983 liability on
potential employees.330 Justice Scalia noted the irony in the Court's
"use [of] one of the principal economic benefits of 'prison
outsourcing'-namely, the avoidance of civil-service salary and
tenure encrustation's-as the justification for a legal rule rendering
322. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
323. See id. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believes that because the decisions
involve political actors whose attentions are split between many issues and who are
spending government funds rather than their own money, considerations of cost and
quality of service will take a back seat to political considerations such as friendship,
political alliances, and other concerns related to re-election. See id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
325. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
328. See id. at 2111-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
330. See id. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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out-sourcing more expensive."33' Since governments could eliminate
civil service salary rules and since civil rights insurance -is readily
available to public as well as private entities, the dissent concluded
that government employers have no more need for a § 1983 immunity
than private employers.33a
Finally, the dissent addressed the Sixth Circuit's assertion that
immunity should not be extended to private-prison employees
because the profit motive makes them more likely to violate
constitutional rights.333 Although the majority chose not to address
this concern, Justice Scalia thought it important to dismiss this myth
by stressing that the threat of § 1983 liability and the subsequent
expenses will actually encourage private prison contractors to exert
more care in operation of the prison in order to minimize costs and
maximize profits.334 In addition, Justice Scalia pointed out that the
House Subcommittee on Crime had stated that "[s]tates having
experimented with prison privatization commonly report that the
overall caliber of the services provided to prisoners has actually
improved in scope and quality. '3 5
The dissent concluded that "the historical principles on which
common-law immunity was based, and which are reflected in our
jurisprudence, plainly cover the private prison guard if they cover the
non-private."3 36 In conclusion, Justice Scalia contended that the only
effect of the majority's decision would be to "artificially raise the cost
of privatizing prisons" with "taxpayers and prisoners ... suffer[ing]
the consequence[s]. ' 37
iii. Conclusion Regarding McKnight Analysis
Justice Scalia's dissent provides the more logical analysis. He
recognized that the majority's historical analysis mistakenly relied on
the absence of a case providing immunity to private prison guards,
rather than revealing "any explicit rejection of immunity by any
common law court."338 While the Supreme Court has not extended
immunity to private prison officials in the past, it never directly
331. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
332. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
333. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
334. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
335. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Matters Relating to the Federal Bureau of
Prisons: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 110 (1996)).
336. Id. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 2113 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 2108 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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addressed the question before, making the absence of traditional
extensions to private prison employees irrelevant.339 Moreover, as
recognized in the dissent, the Court has traditionally extended
immunity using a functional test.3" Probably the only reason the
Wyatt Court did not specifically discuss the functional approach was
that the defendant in that case did not perform a function equivalent
to that of a government official previously granted immunity.341 The
dissent's functional approach to granting immunity should have been
followed, providing private prison employees with the same
immunity offered to their public sector counterparts. 4
iv. Issues Left Open After McKnight
Although the Supreme Court denied immunity for private prison
guards under the circumstances presented in McKnight, the majority
opinion did not resolve all the issues related to private prison
employee liability and immunity. The majority stated that its
decision should not be understood as holding that § 1983 liability
applies to private prison officials. 43 Were the Supreme Court to
determine that private prison operators cannot be held accountable
for violations of inmates' Constitutional rights under § 1983, the
question of immunity would be irrelevant.?4 Second, the Court
limited the context of the holding to "a private firm ... with limited
direct supervision by the government."' 4  A narrow reading of
McKnight leaves an opening for private corporations acting under
339. See id. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
340. See id. at 2109-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 198-209 and
accompanying text (discussing the functional approach the courts have used to determine
whether to grant immunity).
341. The defendant in Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992), was a rancher who
unknowingly used an unconstitutional Mississippi replevin statute to seize the plaintiff's
property. See supra notes 230-49 and accompanying text (discussing Wyatt).
342. See McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ahlstrom, supra
note 65, at 410 (stating that "assertion[s] that profit motivation will cause private prison
officials to infringe prisoners' rights [are] false").
343. See McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2108 (indicating that McKnight does "not address[]
whether the defendants are liable under § 1983 even though they are employed by a
private firm").
344. The Supreme Court accepted, for the purposes of deciding the immunity issue,
the assumption of the court of appeals that a private prison guard was a state actor for the
purposes of § 1983 liability. See id. at 2108. It is likely that a private prison operator
acting according to a contract with the State will be held to be acting under color of state
law and therefore responsible for protecting the constitutional rights of its inmates. See
supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (concluding that private prison employees will
be considered state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability).
345. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2108.
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color of state law in the operation of prison facilities to receive
immunity if the contract or statutes applicable to the corporation are
closely controlled by the State. 46 The majority hinted at this
possibility, stating that "the mere performance of a governmental
function could make the difference between unlimited § 1983 liability
and qualified immunity, especially for a private person who performs
a job without government supervision or direction."' 7  Although
seemingly denying protection against liability to private prison
officials, the McKnight majority left open the possibility of a good-
faith defense to civil rights liability by recognizing that "a distinction
exists between an 'immunity from suit' and other kinds of legal
defenses.""
The Court's caveat that McKnight does not reject the possibility
of a good-faith defense for private employees provides an important
potential outlet to protect private employees from § 1983 liability.
This opening left by the McKnight court for a possible good-faith
defense to liability is the most viable way of counteracting the effect
of the McKnight decision. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,' 49 the
Supreme Court held open the possibility that private parties relying
on statutes later held to be unconstitutional may have a good-faith
defense.3 11 Since the Lugar decision, at least two circuit courts have
recognized a good-faith defense to private parties.3 1 Also, the Fifth
Circuit in Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore5z supported the possibility
of a good-faith defense for private parties by distinguishing between
a good-faith defense and immunity.353
346. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 134, at 145 (noting that "[i]f ... the state retains some
continued role in the exercise of the power in question, the private party may be free
from constitutional restraints as it exercises its share of what had been a government
power").
347. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2105 (citations omitted); see also 2 NAHMOD, supra note
213, § 8:97, at 8-298 (arguing that the language in McKnight indicates "that private parties
.. who are carefully supervised by government, may well be protected by qualified
immunity").
348. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. at 2103 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1992)).
349. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
350. See id. at 942 n.23.
351. See, e.g., Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1266-68 (6th Cir. 1988) (granting good-
faith defense against § 1983 claim for party who relied on his attorney's invocation of an
Ohio attachment statute that was later declared unconstitutional); Buller v. Buechler, 706
F.2d 844, 851-52 (8th Cir. 1983) (granting good-faith defense for creditors invoking an
unconstitutional South Dakota garnishment statute). But see Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d
1, 16 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that there is no good-faith defense available for private
parties).
352. 681 F.2d 1032, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
353. See id.
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The Sixth Circuit's decision in Duncan v. Peck3 -4 provides one
example of the use of the good-faith defense. In Peck, the
defendant-Peck-originally was awarded a $20,000 default
judgment in a contract dispute with the plaintiff, Duncan.3 5 5 Then,
pursuant to state statute, Peck executed the default judgment award
against Duncan's property.35 6 The statute allowing Peck to claim
Duncan's property was subsequently declared unconstitutional, so
Duncan filed a § 1983 claim against Peck for unconstitutional
deprivation of property under an invalid statute. 7 The district court
granted Peck immunity, but the Sixth Circuit held that Peck was
actually entitled to a good-faith defense against the civil rights claim
because he had, in good-faith, relied on the statute as being
enforceable.358 Although the good-faith defense is not the same as a
qualified or other immunity, "it is grounded in many of the same
types of public policy justifications." 359
Applying this good-faith defense to the private prison context
should provide employees of private prisons with at least a limited
defense to § 1983 liability. Private prison contracts and statutes
provide guidance and performance measures which the prison
employees must achieve. If private prison guards violate § 1983 in a
good-faith attempt to comply with statutory and contractual
requirements of the state, it seems reasonable for a court to grant the
guards a defense to § 1983 liability. However, the good-faith defense
has only been granted in cases in which defendants have relied on
seemingly constitutional statutes, as opposed to performing a
discretionary act. Therefore, if enabling statutes do not clearly define
enforcement measures which may be exercised by private prison
employees, courts may be unable to determine whether discretionary
conduct meets a good-faith standard, eliminating the good-faith
defense for private employees. In addition, the benefits offered by
the good-faith defense are not equivalent to the immunity which
could have been granted by McKnight since private prisons will still
have to face litigation expenses and frivolous claims in order to prove
that good-faith was exercised.
354. 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
355. See id. at 1262.
356. See id.
357. See id. at 1262-63.
358. See id. at 1263, 1266-68.
359. Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032,1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
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III. THE USE OF STATUTES AND CONTRACTS TO LIMIT LEGAL
ISSUES AND IMPROVE FACILITIES
Legal issues and public concerns continue to inhibit the
privatization process, leaving prisoners to question their rights in
privately-operated facilities and leaving both the government and
private prison corporations to question potential liabilities. Enabling
legislation that clearly defines the goals of incarceration and precisely
drafted contracts that provide performance measures can help
alleviate these concerns and promote effective use of private prisons.
The following sections discuss the use of enabling statutes and
contracts as mechanisms for creating successful private prisons.
A. Enabling Legislation for Private Prisons
With issues of immunity and liability still not clearly resolved
and the potential for violations of the nondelegation doctrine
resulting from the authority granted.to private corporations, enabling
statutes are critical to the success of the private prison experiment.
Enabling legislation is a prerequisite for privatization development.3 °
At least twenty-five states and the federal government have enacted
enabling statutes authorizing private prison development. 6' Through
these statutes, state legislatures should set requirements for the use
of private prisons, including goals, quality standards, maximum
populations, facility maintenance, liability, and exceptions to
liability.362 Used in this manner, the statutes are a key tool for
ensuring that the historical mistakes and corruption of the private
360. See Ellen Simon, Who's Minding the Rights of Inmates When Justice Goes to the
Lowest Bidder?, 19 HuM. RTS., Spring 1992, at 22,22.
361. See 18 U.S.C. § 4013 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.031 (Michie 1996); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1609 to -1609.01 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN.
88 12-50-101 to -110 (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE. § 6256 (West 1982); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1-201 to -207 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.105, 944.710 - .801,
957.01 - .06 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 11-8-3-1 (Michie 1992); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-5210(i) (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.500-.990 (Michie 1995);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1171 to 15:1179 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.021(1)
(West 1992); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 47-4-1 to -4-5, -5-1201 to -5-1251 (1993 & Supp. 1997);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-106(3) (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-176(2) (1994); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.141 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-H:8(VI) (1988 &
Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1-17, -3-1 to -3-19 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1997); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 148-37 (1994 & Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 54-21-25, 54-23.3-04(12)
(1989 & Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.06 (Anderson Supp. 1997); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 41, 57(D), 504(b)(7), 561 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 41-24-101 to -115 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-26 (1996); W. VA. CODE
83 25-5-1 to -20 (1992); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-22-101 to -114 (Michie 1997).
362. See generally Robbins, supra note 21, at 531 (discussing important considerations
for drafting enabling legislation and providing a model statute).
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prison industry are not repeated.363
Although the nondelegation doctrine has been dismissed as all
but inapplicable to delegation of prison authority,36 statutes can
ensure that the powers vested exclusively in Congress remain in
Congress. Statutes retaining such powers in the legislature can
eliminate arguments over unconstitutional delegations. 365 To prevent
such mistakes, statutes should deal with issues including prisoner
release and disciplining procedures that may be exercised by private
prison employees. Statutes also should provide for state review of
the private institutions' policies and verification that due process
concerns are adequately met. 6  In addition, statutes may be used to
resolve liability and immunity issues, eliminating legal issues and
public concerns over whether private facilities will be responsible for
violating prisoners' constitutional rights.367
Concerns over the standards of care and quality of service may
also be anticipated through drafting of enabling legislation. In order
to maintain identical standards of care and rights of prisoners, several
statutes directly state that all prisoners, whether incarcerated in
363. See supra notes 32-66 and accompanying text (discussing the historical problems
with private prisons).
364. See supra notes 72-130 and accompanying text (discussing the nondelegation
doctrine).
365. Although the nondelegation doctrine has been addressed from the federal
perspective in this Comment, the doctrine may also be relevant at the state level under
state constitutions. In such circumstances, state enabling legislation retaining law-making
and other nondelegable authority in the appropriate government branch will be an
effective tool to limit nondelegation concerns. States have commonly passed laws
authorizing private prisons in order to preempt the delegation issue. See Nicole B.
Cisarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The
Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249,260-61 (1995).
States must be careful in drafting statutes authorizing the use of private prisons so
they do not delegate authority which must be retained by the government. See Ratliff,
supra note 65, at 373-74. In addition, other issues such as due process may be addressed
by enabling statutes. See id. at 411-19 (discussing ways in which states have addressed
due process concerns).
366. See, e.g., Ratliff, supra note 65. at 398-402 (explaining that private operators
should not control prisoner release dates, disciplinary rules, inmate classification systems,
or work programs).
367. For example, the Tennessee enabling statute denies the private prison contractor
any qualified immunity. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-107 (1997). To alleviate liability
issues, several states require that private contractors maintain liability insurance. See
Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private Correctional Management: A Comparison
of Enabling Legislation, 60 FED. PROBATION 49,50 (1996). These states include Arizona,
Arkansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1609.1(N)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12-50-106(f)(2) (Michie
1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.510(30) (Michie 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-
17(D)(2) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561(m)(1)-(2) (West
1991 & Supp. 1998).
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private or public facilities, are considered inmates of the state's
corrections department.368  According to one commentator, half of
the states have enacted enabling legislation requiring that private
"facilities comply with local and state regulations and meet American
Corrections Association standards. 369 If contractors do not comply
with the statutory terms, the contracts may be terminated.370
In addition, statutes may be used to help improve the conditions
and quality of service in confinement facilities. 71  States have
accomplished this by requiring private contractors to provide specific
services for inmates, including mail, telephone, and visitation
services.3 72 Several states have gone a step further, using the statutes
as an opportunity to redefine the goals of incarceration by requiring
rehabilitative services including vocational training, educational
programs, counseling, mental health programs, and chemical
dependency counseling.373
368. Colorado states in its enabling statute that any person sentenced to any
correctional facility is deemed to be in the custody of the Executive Director of the
Department of Corrections and therefore subject to the same rules and standards
regardless of whether the facility is operated privately or by the state. See COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-102 (West 1997). See also Murphy v. Pakenham 923 P.2d 375, 376
(Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a private prison that adopts the state disciplinary code
is subject to review in the same manner as a state agency).
369. Simon, supra note 360, at 22 (paraphrasing Professor Charles Thomas). See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12-50-106 (Michie 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 957.05 (West 1996);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
370. States may include authorization to inspect the private facilities to ensure
compliance with statutory mandates. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-4-5 (Michie 1992).
371. Typically, enabling statutes have only required the same services and quality as
state run prisons; however, legislation has been introduced requiring improvements to the
existing system. See Blakely & Bumphus, supra note 367, at 52. Quality requirements
should also be specified in statutes to verify that the goal of privatization is not merely to
save money but also to improve the unconstitutional conditions currently provided by
many public prisons.
372. Kentucky and West Virginia have enabling legislation requiring the contractor to
provide these services. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.510(19) (Michie 1995); W. VA.
CODE § 25-5-11(b) (1992). Kentucky and West Virginia also require the availability of
legal services to inmates. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.510(19)(d) (Michie 1995); W.
VA. CODE § 25-5-11(b)(4) (1992).
373. Enabling statutes in Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West Virginia
require vocational training or educational programs. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-
106(e)(2) (Michie 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5201 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 197.510(19)(e), (f) (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561 (West 1991 & Supp.
1998); W. VA. CODE § 25-5-11(b)(5), (6) (1992). Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West
Virginia all require counseling and mental health programs, supporting the use of prison
time to rehabilitate prisoners, an effort which has largely been abandoned in overcrowded
public prisons. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5201 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 197.510(19)(g) (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561 (West 1991 & Supp.
1998); W. VA. CODE § 25-5-11(b)(7) (1992); see also supra note 18 (discussing the
absence of rehabilitative programs in prisons).
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Another concern that may be alleviated by statute is the
credibility and qualifications of corporations bidding for
incarceration contracts. To limit who may be authorized to operate a
private prison, contractor qualifications may be and often are
specified in the enabling legislation. To help protect against
incompetent private party operation of facilities, several states have
specified that the contractor must be experienced in the operation of
a confinement facility or that such qualifications at least be included
as a consideration in awarding contracts.37 4 At least twenty-one states
define some qualifications that the contractor must meet.75 Several
states require that the contractor have previous experience in the
prison industry and also have a history of compliance with state
regulations and court orders. 76
Enabling statutes are the first step toward successful
implementation of a private prison system. Time must be spent
drafting proper statutes that will clearly define the goals to be met by
confinement and the means by which they will be achieved. 7  Doing
so will limit potential legal issues and liability for a state.
B. Contracts for Private Prisons
Supplementing the guidance provided by enabling legislation,
states may use well-drafted contracts to reduce public concerns
related to the privatization of prisons. Individual contracts with
corporations offer state and federal government the opportunity to
define the mission of the prison and to ensure that the specified goals
374. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-106(c)(3) (Michie 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.520
(Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1800.4 (West Supp. 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 57, § 561 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
375. See Blakely & Bumphus, supra note 367, at 52. Some qualification requirements
include previous experience, a record of compliance with state regulations and court
orders, state accreditation, and adequate liability insurance. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1609.01(B), (N) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-106(c),
(f)(2) (Michie 1995); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 197.520 (Michie 1995).
376. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(B) (West 1992 & 1997); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561 (West 1991 & 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(a)(3)
(1997). Private prison employees may also be required to meet specified training
requirements. See W.VA. CODE § 25-5-19 (1992).
377. Five recommendations have been made to simplify the privatization process and
increase the market benefits of competition: (1) develop uniform state legislation; (2)
develop uniformity among contractors; (3) develop uniform standards for contractors; (4)
form a committee to coordinate and facilitate cooperation between states; and (5)
conduct additional studies to address these issues. See Blakely & Bumphus, supra note
367, at 52. Meeting these goals will simplify the privatization process and encourage
states to learn from previous mistakes. See id.
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are met.378 The contract between the government and the private
prison facility may be the key to the success of private prisons,
offering the opportunity to unite public interests with the benefits
offered by the private sector.379 Careful contracting is critical to
defining the authority of private prisons and limiting liability of the
state. "The potential benefit of contracting-out depends upon the
precision and durability of the contractual link between creating
value and collecting profits."3 For instance, the potential savings
offered by privatizing prisons, and often recognized as the key motive
behind the privatization movement, can be guaranteed through
contract provisions. This goal has repeatedly been stressed in
statutes and contracts requiring the contractor to save the
government money.38 '
Professor Robbins has proposed that the following
considerations, among others, can and should be specified in the
contracts between the government and private prison operators:
what expectations and standards will guide the prison's operation;
how the implementation of these standards will be monitored; what
recourse will be available for breach of specified standards; what
procedures will be used for prison disciplinary hearings; whether the
private facility can refuse inmates; and what measures may be taken
to prevent government dependence and unfair bargaining by the
private prison operator.3s  The contract documents both parties'
378. Logan, supra note 59, at 585.
379. According to Charles Logan, "[c]ontractual arrangements have at least the
potential for a high degree of symbolic significance. The responsibilities are laid out in
the contract. The accountabilities are laid out in the contract. And the criteria for
evaluation are laid out in the contract." Talk of the Nation, supra note 88.
380. DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 11. Factors that will affect the quality of the link
include the existence of competition, complete specification of the product to be offered,
effective monitoring of quality, and the government's willingness and ability to terminate
the contract or penalize the contractor for inadequate performance. See id.
381. Contracts may specify a percentage savings the private prison must meet. Both
Arizona and Tennessee have enacted legislation requiring that the private contractor
reduce the cost of confinement. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(G) (West 1992
& Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(2)(c)(B) (1997). The government must
also learn from its mistakes in contracting. For instance, CCA took over Hamilton
County's Silverdale Work Farm in Tennessee on a per diem basis, charging three dollars
less per prisoner than the state had been paying in the previous year; however, at the time
of contracting Silverdale was operating at 25% below capacity and within the first year of
the contract an inmate population increase drove the contract cost over the county's
corrections budget. See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 17. The contract failed to account for
"cost structures" or to anticipate a tougher drunken-driving sentencing law which drove
up the prison population. See id.
382. See Robbins, supra note 12, at 825-26.
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expectations and provides contingency plans. 313
An additional provision that should be mandatory in
government contracts with private prisons is a termination clause.3 4
This provision will help ensure a smooth transition if the government
finds it necessary to terminate a contract, by including clearly defined
procedures to allow the government to reclaim the facility from the
private operator.38 5 Additionally, it should provide terms defining
how private operators will be compensated for any improvements
they made while controlling the facility.3 6
While many provisions are necessary in a contract which out-
sources the government's incarceration function, other terms may be
used to ensure that prisoners as well as taxpayers benefit from
privatization. Contract provisions, including "well-defined standards
of performance," may ensure that profit motives do not "conflict with
the government's interest in maintaining safe, secure, and humane
conditions ... [and avoiding] legal cases and litigation brought on by
or on behalf of inmates.' '3 7 As a result, many of the fears created by
the dismal history of private incarceration facilities and concerns
expounded by private prison opponents may be eliminated.388
Contract provisions can be used to help ensure that required quality
standards are maintained because corporations fearful of losing their
contracts are forced to comply with the contract provisions.389
Both opponents and proponents of the privatization of prisons
agree that delegating incarceration to private parties does not
eliminate a government's liability.39  Opponents of prison
383. See Cooper, supra note 87, at 134.
384. See Robbins, supra note 21, at 729-30. The enabling legislation can ensure that a
termination clause is a mandatory piece of every contract by requiring that a satisfactory
plan is incorporated into the contract and approved by the appropriate legislative body
prior to the contract becoming effective. See id. at 730.
385. "The termination provisions help to ease the transition when control of the
facility changes." Id.
386. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 7 (using a proposed contract between
Tennessee and CCA as an example of a private prison initiative). For proposed model
contract provisions related to the termination of a private prison contract, see Robbins,
supra note 21, at 731-33.
387. SHICHOR, supra note 66, at 114-15.
388. See Cooper, supra note 87, at 135.
389. Recognizing historical contract mistakes which have allowed private prisons to
cut corners in attempts to reduce expenses, New Mexico attorney Mark Donatelli
acknowledged that "the state should have a contract stipulating that how much the
provider gets paid is related to a full staffing complement." Simon, supra note 360, at 23.
390. See CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: PROS & CONS 184 (1990); Robbins,
supra note 21, at 579. Professor Thomas has stated that "no representative of any private
corporation has even one time in any document I have ever found-and I've reviewed
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privatization argue that the inability of the government to shift
liability away from itself is one more reason that privatizing prisons is
an ineffective solution to high incarceration costs; however, proper
contracting can remove government liability.3 91 Agreements typically
provide insurance requirements for the private facility, with
indemnification clauses to protect the government from facing § 1983
liability for the private operator's violations.39
Prison management is another concern for opponents of private
prisons that can be alleviated by careful contracting. Corrections
facilities are "only as good as the staff, management program,
facilities, resources and support that [they receive]; the formula for
success is no different than publicly operated institutions. What does
differ, though, is the need to have a tightly structured contract in
order that the private sector ... be held accountable. '393 As a result,
proper legislation and well-drafted contracts can set forth necessary
supervision of prison operations. 94 Contracts with private prisons
offer an opportunity to improve prison management and conditions
by reducing populations in currently over-crowded facilities and
subsequently placing requirements for space, rehabilitation, and
quality directly in the contract, uniting the goals of the incarceration
facility with those of business. 95
One of the greatest consequences of the privatization movement
is the renewed interest in performance measures. According to one
commentator, "[o]ne of the first consequences of privatization has
been that government has been forced to ask the question of what it
wants its prisons to do, to write them into the contract, and [to
determine] how it is going to measure and evaluate the achievement
of these purposes. ' 396  The resulting renewed interest in quality
standards and the reevaluation of the purpose of incarceration has
been applied to both private and public sector prisons, encouraging
prisons to be more focused and effective. 397 Profits provide private
hundreds of them-ever made [the] allegation [that contracting with a private prison
operator eliminates government liability]." Privatization Backers Criticize ABA for
Issuing Negative Report, 19 CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., Dec. 15, 1988, at 3, 4.
391. See Cooper, supra note 87, at 134. Although the government cannot technically
shift liability, it can contract with corporations to ensure indemnification of damages
resulting from liability.
392 See Joel, supra note 9, at 69-70.
393. NATIONAL INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRIVATE SECTOR
OPERATION OF A CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION ix (1985).
394. Dipiano, supra note 43, at 200.
395. See Durham, supra note 43, at 35.
396. Talk of the Nation, supra note 88 (comments of Professor Charles Logan).
397. See id. (discussing the new interest in performance standards that has developed
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prisons a great incentive to meet performance criteria, achieving
contract specifications and maintaining marketable reputations. 98
Although many opponents of private prisons are concerned that
the profit motive and the per diem payment plan provided in many
contracts create an incentive for private prisons to desire recidivism,
commentators have proposed that contracts may actually be used to
require reduced rates of recidivism.3 99 Using contract-based fines to
penalize private prison operators for violations of recidivism-
reduction requirements, inmate safety, health care quality, or other
standards, agreements between private contractors and the
government can invoke the profit motive to encourage compliance
with the state's defined goals of incarceration."' In addition,
treatment services, operational services, and limits of authority
should be specified.4 1 Contracts may include requirements for
availability of vocational and educational programs or other
recreational activities."° Joseph Johnson, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of National Corrections and Rehabilitation
Corporation, recognizes the importance of the contract and its ability
to define the goals of a private prison facility. Johnson has said that
certain private facilities are "tied in a contractual way ... to get
people into a vocational education program, to get them a particular
skill level, to get them to pass a GED test, to get them an industry job
while they're in [the] facility."4 3 For inmates in drug or alcohol-
abuse programs, contracts may commit prison operators to follow
former inmates into communities and help them get the continued
treatment they need, as well as help them secure employment . 40
Corrections Corporation of America's contract in Dallas uses the
profit motive as an incentive to reduce recidivism, penalizing the
corporation with contract reductions if it fails to find jobs for a
specified number of inmates upon their release.0 5 In addition, out-
as a result of privatization).
398. Cf Ahlstrom, supra note 65, at 411-12 (explaining that the combination of the
contract's visibility and the corporation's profit motivation forces prison contractors to
protect prisoners' civil rights).
399. See Kenneth L. Avid, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model
Contract and Model Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CoNFINEMENT 265, 294-95 (1991); James Theodore Gentry, Note, The Panopicon
Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353,361-63 (1986).
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402. See SHICHOR, supra note 66, at 115.
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sourcing payment plans can encourage humane prison conditions by
prohibiting overcrowding. °6 By contract, the government will only
be willing to pay for and the facility will only be allowed to house a
specified number of inmates.4 7 Public facilities fail to be protected
by equivalent provisions.4 8
However, a very real concern exists regarding private
involvement in "good time"409 computation for prisoners. Private
involvement in "good time" calculation creates a potential conflict of
interest, allowing a corporation which gets paid according to
occupancy to help determine when prisoners should be released. As
a result, opponents of privatization are concerned that private prisons
with vacancies will disallow "good time" if provided such authority,
in order to maintain full occupancy and full compensation from the
state. This inherent conflict creates a valid concern; however, proper
contracting considerations can help eliminate or at least limit this
potential problem.410 Corrections Corporation of America has
avoided this problem by being careful to keep "good-time" credits
and sentencing credits out of its contracts, allowing government
monitors to retain such authority.4 Most states have attempted to
avoid this problem before contracting by statutorily retaining the
authority to calculate inmate release and parole eligibility in the
state.
412
Questions of private prison operator liability for violations of
prisoners' constitutional rights in private prison facilities may also be
put to rest through contracting. Contracts, in conjunction with
statutes, can state that the private prison takes the responsibility to
protect the constitutional rights that publicly operated prisons are
obligated to protect under § 1983. Joseph Johnson has acknowledged
that the contractual agreements treat the private facilities as if they
were acting under color of law as a public entity, therefore, requiring
the employees and the facilities to meet the same responsibilities and
accreditation standards as a public facility.4 3
406. See id.
407. See id.
408. See Ahlstrom, supra note 65, at 412.
409. "Good time" is a type of disciplinary credit used as an incentive to encourage
inmate's good behavior and cooperation through reduction of sentences and the potential
for early parole. See Marjorie M. Van Ochten, Prison Disciplinary Hearings: Enforcing
the Rules Behind Bars, 77 MICH. B.J. 178, 180 (1998).
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Of course a perfect contract is to no avail if performance is not
monitored,4 14 but private prison contracts are under the watchful eyes
of "prison reform activists, civil rights groups such as the A.C.L.U.,
and more important the media" as well as "competitors, investors,
shareholders, and insurers. A misstep in any of the variables
incorporated into a contract places the private firm under intense
scrutiny that can affect that firm's profitability ... not to mention its
integrity. '41  The profit motive and the heightened level of
monitoring will mandate private facilities to maintain a greater level
of quality or suffer contractual penalties, including possible contract
termination. For instance, a 1995 riot at one privately operated
facility provoked the government to shut down the facility even
though no injuries were suffered in the incident.416 Upon release of
the news of the lost contract, the private corporation's stock dropped
$13, more than fifty percent of the stock's prior market value.4t 7
Constant public scrutiny, concerns over profitability, and contractual
requirements of government supervision will help ensure necessary
monitoring.
The benefits of privatizing prisons extend beyond saving
taxpayer money. One commentator explained that private prison
contracts "are much more detailed than the 'legislative mandates
public corrections agencies are obliged to follow,' setting forth the
expectations of both parties and the consequences of failing to meet
those expectations.41 The benefits provided by the renewed interest
in performance measures will help refocus the prison industry's
objectives, benefiting both private and public prisons alike. Using
effective contracts in conjunction with well thought out enabling
statutes can limit the potential legal issues surrounding private
prisons and ease public concerns related to prisoners' rights by
requiring better conditions and reduced recidivism.
Enabling statutes and contracts can not eliminate all the
potential risks of privatization; however, considering the prison
overpopulation crisis this nation is currently facing, such tools make
privatization of prisons a viable alternative.
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415. Richard C. Brister, Changing the Guard: A Case for Privatization of Texas
Prisons, 76 PRISON J. 310, 322 (1996).
416. See AhIstrom, supra note 65, at 413.
417. See id.
418. Brister, supra note 415, at 322 (quoting Thomas and Logan, supra note 7, at 223),
[Vol. 762264
1998] PRIVATIZA TION OF PRISONS 2265
IV. CONCLUSION
Private prisons offer one alternative to help alleviate the current
prison population crisis. Although America's early attempts at
prison privatization are marred by tales of abuse, applying lessons
learned from previous mistakes to enabling statutes and performance
measuring contracts can help bring private sector advantages to the
prison industry. Regardless of whether prison privatization is
successful, it offers an opportunity to redefine the goals of the prison
system and improve confinement conditions, thus benefitting both
prisoners and the public.
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